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Abstract:
To date, relatively few academic studies have analyzed congressional candidates’ use of
social media in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections. This paper contributes to the literature by
conducting a textual analysis of 697 House candidates’ Twitter posts from between January 1 st
and November 6th 2018. The study focuses on seven key issues – the economy, gun policy,
healthcare, immigration, Russia, the Supreme Court, and the Trump presidency – and assesses
whether there was a fundamental difference in how Democratic and Republican candidates
approached each one. The paper argues that there were partisan differences in social media use
and presents two potential explanations: political polarization and how each political party was
confronted with unique challenges.
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Introduction
Social media platforms are more popular than ever in the United States. When the Pew
Research Center began tracking social media adoption in 2005, just five percent of American
adults used at least one platform (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). By 2011, that share had
risen to half of all adults (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). In 2018, an even greater percentage,
approximately seven in ten adults, used some type of social media (“Social Media Fact Sheet”,
2018). In particular, 73 percent of U.S. adults used YouTube, 68 percent used Facebook, 35
percent used Instagram, 29 percent used Pinterest, 27 percent used Snapchat, 24 percent used
Twitter, and 22 percent used WhatsApp (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018).
The use of social media is not limited to the general public, as politicians use social
media sites to communicate with constituents and potential voters. According to a recent report
by the Congressional Research Service, virtually all members of Congress – 99 percent of
Representatives and 100 percent of Senators – used Facebook in 2018 (Straus, 2018, p. 3).
Similarly, all 535 voting members of Congress had a Twitter account in 2018 (Straus, 2018, p.
3).
This paper discusses how Democratic and Republican candidates running for the U.S.
House of Representatives used social media in the months leading up to the 2018 midterm
elections. It focuses on seven key issues – the economy, gun policy, healthcare, immigration,
Russia, the Supreme Court, and the Trump presidency – and assesses whether there was a
fundamental difference in how Democratic and Republican candidates approached each one. The
paper argues that there were partisan differences in social media use and presents two potential
explanations: political polarization and how each political party was confronted with unique
challenges. It also considers whether incumbents and non-incumbents used social media
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differently and whether the same was true of candidates running in more competitive districts
versus candidates running in “safe” districts.
The paper consists of five chapters. The first is a theoretical section that defines social
media, considers why politicians use sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and provides two
explanations for partisan differences in social media use. The second chapter outlines the history
of how campaigns used social media between 2008 and 2016. The third summarizes the existing
literature on the 2018 midterms, which provides needed context for interpreting data results in
the following chapter. The fourth is a quantitative section that includes an analysis of nearly 700
congressional candidates’ Twitter posts from between January 1 st and November 6th 2018. The
final chapter lays out areas for exploration in future papers about the 2018 midterm elections.
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1 Literature Review
1.1 Some Basic Questions
In order to understand the role of social media in American elections, four basic
questions need to be answered. These answers will provide a theoretical framework for the rest
of the paper.
1.1.1 What Is Social Media?
Social media is a surprisingly difficult term to define, given a lack of consensus. Some
definitions focus on social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter (Boyd & Ellison,
2007). By comparison, other definitions of social media include blogs, photo and video sharing
communities, and web forums (Agichtein, 2008, p. 183). Nevertheless, there are some common
themes in the academic literature. First, social media are “online tools operating via the broader
Internet” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010; Carr & Hayes, 2015). Second, content on social media is
user generated. Put differently, the value of using social media is derived from the “contributions
from or interactions with other users rather than content generated by [the] organization or
individual hosting the medium” (Carr & Hayes, 2015, p. 51). Third, social media consist of what
Carr and Hayes (2015, p. 50) describe as “disentrained, persistent channels.” Unlike in face-toface communication, people do not have to interact at the same time on social media. Rather,
they can log into Facebook, Twitter, or another site at completely different hours. Fourth, social
media “enable users to articulate and make visible their social networks” (Boyd & Ellison, 2007,
p. 211). According to Boyd and Ellison (2007, p. 211), this can result in connections between
individuals that would not otherwise be made.
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1.1.2 What Ultimately Drives Politicians’ Behavior?
Back in the 1970s, long before the advent of social media, the political scientists Richard
Fenno and David Mayhew wrote two seminal books, Home Style and Congress: The Electoral
Connection respectively, about the electoral process. While their books are over 40 years old,
both books are essential for understanding modern American politics, including how and why
politicians use social media.
The two political scientists give slightly different answers about what ultimately drives
politicians’ behavior. In his earlier book Congressmen in Committees (1973), Fenno claims that
members of Congress have three primary goals: being reelected, achieving influence within
Congress, and making “good public policy” (Mayhew, 1974, p. 16). By contrast, Mayhew (1974,
p. 16) believes that being reelected is the “proximate goal of everyone” and that this goal must be
achieved “over and over if other ends are to be entertained.” In short, both scholars agree that
politicians are driven at least in part by the need to win reelection, even if Mayhew places more
emphasis on this goal.
1.1.3 How Do Politicians Win Elections?
In Home Style, Fenno outlines three strategies that members of Congress use to earn the
support of their constituents. The first is the politician’s allocation of his or her personal
resources and those of his or her office (Fenno, 1978, p. 33) The second strategy is the
politician’s presentation of self to others (Fenno, 1978, p. 33). In particular, a politician should
stress his or her qualifications for the job, convey a sense of identification with constituents, and
express empathy for their problems (Fenno, 1978, p. 56-57). The third strategy is the politician’s
explanation of his or her Washington activity to others (Fenno, 1978, p. 33).
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Mayhew, meanwhile, argues in Congress: The Electoral Connection that all members of
Congress “must constantly engage in activities related to reelection”, regardless of whether they
are running in safe or marginal districts (Mayhew, 1974, p. 49). One strategy to accomplish this
goal is advertising, which he defines as “any effort to disseminate one’s name among
constituents in such a fashion to create a favorable image but in messages [that have] little or no
issue content” (Mayhew, 1974, p. 49). In particular, a politician should stress personal qualities
such as experience, knowledge, responsiveness, concern, sincerity, and independence (Mayhew,
1974, p. 49). A second strategy is credit claiming, i.e. taking credit for something that benefits
constituents (Mayhew, 1974, p. 53). A third strategy is position taking, which Mayhew (1974, p.
61) defines as “the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of
interest to political actors.”
1.1.4 Why Do Politicians Use Social Media?
A separate but related question is why politicians use social media in particular to
communicate with voters. One benefit of this strategy is that politicians can bypass traditional
journalism and convey messages directly to potential voters (Anderson, 2015). A second benefit
is that online advertising often has fewer constraints than other types of ads. For example,
Internet videos, unlike television ads, do not have to be 30 or 60 seconds long or include a
disclaimer (Fenn, 2009, p. 219). As a result, Internet videos are able to go into more depth, and at
a fraction of the cost. A third reason is that politicians can reach a large audience of Americans,
especially young people, on social media. As already discussed, about seven in ten adults used
some type of social networking site in 2018 (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). This included 88
percent of 18-29 year olds and 78 percent of 30-49 year olds (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018).
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1.2 Reasons For Partisan Differences In Social Media Use In 2018
Both Democratic and Republican politicians running in the 2018 midterms used social
media, but they emphasized different issues and framed them in distinct ways. Partisan
differences in social media use can potentially be explained by two factors: (a) political
polarization and (b) how each party was confronted with unique challenges.
1.2.1 Political Polarization
Over the past few decades, political polarization has grown in the United States, both
among politicians and the general public. Democrats and Republicans increasingly share
homogeneous views with members of their own party, and divergent views with members of the
opposite party. Former House Speaker Tip O’Neill (D-MA)’s famous quote that “all politics are
local” is increasingly outdated in an environment in which congressional elections are
nationalized (Gelman, 2011).
Elite polarization: The Oxford Dictionaries define an elite as “a group or class of people
seen as having the most power and influence in a society, especially on account of their wealth or
privilege” (“Elite”). For the purposes of this paper, the term refers to American politicians
running for national office. However, in other contexts, the word “elite” could just as easily refer
to other groups, such as businessmen.
According to an analysis by the National Journal, Congress grew much more
ideologically polarized between 1982 and 2013. In 1982, 58 senators and 344 House members
had voting records that put them between the most liberal Republican and the most conservative
Democrat (Kraushaar, 2014). By contrast, in 2013, no senators and only four House members
occupied the same territory (Kraushaar, 2014). In fact, the author of the study concluded that
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“the ideological sorting of the House and Senate by party, which [had] been going on for more
than three decades, [was] virtually complete (Kraushaar, 2014).
The graph below shows how liberal or conservative the mean Democrat and Republican
was in each Congress between 1879 to 2014, as measured by roll call votes (“The Polarization of
the Congressional Parties”, 2015). Time (years) is on the x-axis while ideology is on the y-axis.
The graph shows that since 1980, the mean Republican has become significantly more
conservative (“The Polarization of the Congressional Parties”, 2015). By contrast, the mean
Democrat has become slightly more liberal but by a much smaller extent (“The Polarization of
the Congressional Parties”, 2015). The biggest internal change is that the mean northern
Democrat and mean southern Democrat are now ideologically similar, whereas northerners used
to be much more liberal compared to southerners (“The Polarization of the Congressional
Parties”, 2015).

Fig. 1. Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension, 1879-2014. From “The Polarization of the Congressional
Parties.” Vote View, 21 Mar 2015.

Besides congressional voting records, another way social scientists can measure elite
polarization is through the diction that politicians use. For example, one study by the economists
Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro, and Matt Taddy analyzed congressional-floor speeches
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going back to 1873, using a statistical model estimating how easy or hard it would be for a
typical listener to “guess a speaker’s political party based on the words the speaker used in one
minute of speech” (Ingraham, 2016). Their conclusion was that the partisanship of language
“exploded in recent decades”, beginning in the 1990s (Gentzkow et al., 2016, p. 3). The
economists highlight how the 1994 midterms were a “watershed moment in political messaging,
with consultants such as Frank Luntz applying novel techniques to identify effective language
and disseminate it to candidates” (Gentzkow et al., 2016, p. 4). Ultimately, the 1994 midterms
“kicked off a neologism arms race, a prolonged attempt by members of both parties to coin
catchy new terms for their pet policies, particularly for taxes, immigration, and healthcare”
(Ingraham, 2016). In addition, Gentzkow et al. (2016, p. 4) speculate that other changes, such as
the expansion of cable television coverage, may have also provided “further incentives for
linguistic innovation.”

Fig. 2. The Rise of Partisan Language in Congress, 1976-2008. From Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt
Taddy. “Measuring Group Differences in High-Dimensional Choices: Method and Application to Congressional
Speech.” The National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22423, Jul 2016.
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Fig. 3. The Rise of Partisan Neologisms, 1870-2010. From Gentzkow, Matthew, Jesse M. Shapiro & Matt Taddy.
“Measuring Group Differences in High-Dimensional Choices: Method and Application to Congressional Speech.”
The National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 22423, Jul 2016.

Popular/mass polarization: According to a study by the Pew Research Center, the
American electorate grew more ideologically polarized between 1994 and 2014, as measured by
their responses to ten political values questions (“Ideological Uniformity”, 2014). In 1994, 64
percent of Republicans were to the right of the median Democrat. In addition, 70 percent of
Democrats were to the left of the median Republican. By contrast, those percentages were 92
percent and 94 percent respectively in 2014 (“Ideological Uniformity”, 2014).
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Fig. 4. 1994 Political Polarization in the American Public. From “Political Polarization in the American Public: How
Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise, and Everyday Life.” Pew
Research Center, 12 Jun 2014.
Fig. 5. 2014 Political Polarization in the American Public. From “Political Polarization in the American Public: How
Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise, and Everyday Life.” Pew
Research Center, 12 Jun 2014.

One reason for mass polarization is self-sorting. Back in the 1970s, partisan affiliation
did not depend as much on ideology and both parties had strong liberal and conservative factions
(Levendusky, 2009). Subsequently, though, liberals “selected” into the Democratic Party while
conservatives “selected” into the Republican Party (Levendusky, 2009). The political scientist
Matthew Levendusky (2009) argues that this partisan sorting “results directly from the
increasingly polarized terms in which political leaders define their parties.” He also demonstrates
his book The Partisan Sort that “sorting makes voters more loyally partisan, allowing campaigns
to focus more attention on mobilizing committed supporters” (Levendusky, 2009). Todd & Tann
(2017) concur, arguing that since only about ten percent of voters are persuadable, political
campaigns spend most of their time trying to mobilize partisans.
1.2.2 Unique Challenges Facing Each Party
In 2018, each party was confronted with unique challenges. After Russia interfered in the
2016 presidential election, Democrats worried that Russians might infiltrate social media again
two years later and once again disseminate incendiary messages (Scherer, 2018). Meanwhile,
Republicans had to deal with President Donald Trump’s unpopularity. According to
FiveThirtyEight, Trump’s net approval was nearly 10 points underwater throughout all of 2018
(“How popular is Donald Trump”, 2018). Likewise, a Morning Consult poll from November
2018 found that Trump had a net negative approval rating in 26 states (“Trump’s Net Approval”,
2018). In fact, between January 2017 and November 2018, the President’s net approval rating
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went down in every state (“Trump’s Net Approval”, 2018). Trump’s unpopularity threatened to
drag down Republican candidates running in competitive districts.

1.3 Assessment of the Existing Literature
As Chapter 1 makes clear, the academic literature on social media and politics has many
strengths. First, it helps determine what constitutes social media. Second, it explains what
ultimately motivates politicians (winning reelection) and their reasons for using social media in
particular. Third, the academic literature provides insightful background information about
political polarization, one potential reason for partisan differences in social media use in 2018.
However, one shortcoming of the literature is that relatively little academic research has
analyzed the 2018 midterms. The lack of studies is an opportunity for this thesis to make a real
contribution.
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2 History of Social Media in Politics
Chapter 2 outlines the history of social media in campaigns. It first provides a brief
overview of each cycle from 2008 to 2016, and then discusses how social media was used in
each cycle. This is important because many of the social media platforms and strategies used in
past election cycles were used once again in 2018.

2.1 2008 Election Cycle
In the 2008 presidential election, Democratic nominee Barack Obama (D-IL) defeated
Republican nominee John McCain (R-AZ), subsequently becoming the first ever AfricanAmerican president of the United States. Obama received 365 electoral votes, and 52.9 percent
of the total vote, while McCain received only 173 electoral votes, and 45.7 percent of the vote
(“Presidential Election of 2008”, 2018). Meanwhile, Democrats had a net gain of eight seats in
the Senate and 21 seats in the House of Representatives (“Election Results”, 2008). Overall,
November 4th 2008 was a very good night for Democrats.
In the 2008 cycle, an estimated $17 million was spent on online advertising, making it the
first election in which there was serious spending on Internet ads (Fenn, 2009, p. 217). However,
it is also worth putting the number in context. About $2.6 billion was spent on total political
advertising in 2008, meaning that the vast majority was spent on traditional media (Seelye,
2008). In subsequent cycles, the amount of online spending by campaigns would grow
dramatically, as the value of online advertising became more appreciated.
Most social media sites were relatively new in 2008. MySpace, one of the main social
networking sites at the time, was launched as recently as 2003 (“The History of Social Media”,
2019). Facebook was created in 2004 and only became available to the general public in 2006
(“The History of Social Media”, 2019). YouTube was from 2006, and Instagram and Snapchat
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would not be launched until 2010 and 2011 respectively (“The History Of Social Media”, 2019).
Nevertheless, many social media sites, especially YouTube, proved to be influential in 2008.
During the 2008 campaign cycle, 39 percent of voters watched some type of campaign-related
video on YouTube or another web video site (Gulati, 2010, p. 189). In particular, 27 percent of
the public had watched at least one of these four videos: “Obama Girl”, “Bomb Iran”, “I Feel
Pretty”, and the Clintons’ parody of the Sopranos’ final episode (Cornfield, 2009, p. 209). 44
percent had heard of at least one of them (Cornfield, 2009, p. 209).
In the 2008 election cycle, there was a mismatch between the online activity of
Democrats and Republicans. For example, the average Democratic Senate candidate with a
Facebook page had 1,853.2 followers, whereas the average Republican had only 571.9 (Gulati,
2010, p. 199). Likewise, the average Democratic House candidate with a Facebook page had
416.7 followers, whereas the average Republican had only 260.8 (Gulati, 2010, p. 199).
Nowhere was the partisan divide on social media more pronounced than at the
presidential level. In 2008, the Obama campaign was very innovative in using social media, such
as Facebook, Linkedin, and YouTube (Bimber, 2014, p. 134). The campaign even had its own
social media site, MyBO, that “provided registered users with activism tools such as phone
banking and volunteer coordination” (Bimber, 2014, p. 134). By contrast, the McCain campaign
was less effective at using social media. The Republican candidate experimented much less with
new technologies and made the poor decision to treat his digital strategy as separate from his
“main campaign” (Bimber, 2014, p. 136). One reason for this was McCain’s tech illiteracy. In an
interview with The New York Times in July 2008, the Senator described himself as “not literate
with the Internet and as dependent on his wife and aides to get online in order to read
newspapers” (Bimber, 2014, p. 136). Ultimately, McCain would be the last major presidential
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candidate in the U.S. to run for office “treating the digital media environment as distinct and
separate from the larger context for political communication” (Bimber, 2014, p. 136).
The Democratic nominee also had substantially more followers on social media. On
Election Day 2008, Obama had about 112,000 Twitter followers, whereas McCain only had
5,000 (Bimber, 2014, p. 137). On Facebook, Obama had about 2 million followers; McCain had
only 600,000 (Bimber, 2014, p. 137). About 115,000 people subscribed to Obama’s YouTube
channel, compared to only 28,000 to McCain’s (Bimber, 2014, p. 137).
In an article from two years later, the political scientist Girish Gulati provides a few
reasons why Republicans initially struggled with navigating the new media environment. First,
incumbent politicians sometimes have a tendency to rely on communications strategies they have
successfully used in the past (Gulati, 2010, p. 198). This reticence to change what has worked
sometimes stifles newer ways to reach constituents and donors. Second, Republican strategists
and activists found the “unruly nature of the Internet foreign and unpredictable” (Gulati, 2010, p.
199). Third, the McCain campaign struggled financially in 2007, which made it harder for the
Republican presidential nominee to invest early in the “infrastructure and staff needed for an
extensive online effort” (Gulati, 2010, p. 199).

2.2 2010 Election Cycle
Compared to 2008, the Democratic Party fared much worse in the 2010 midterm
elections. Democrats suffered a net loss of six seats in the Senate and 63 seats in the House of
Representatives (Blake, 2014). Ultimately, Democrats lost control of the House and would not be
able to reclaim it until the 2018 midterms (Madison, 2010). The results in 2010 were so poor that
President Obama described Election Night as a “shellacking” and he took responsibility for what
he saw as “humbling” losses (Madison, 2010). A second reason the 2010 midterms were
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noteworthy was low voter turnout. Only 36.9 percent of the voting-age population cast ballots,
compared to 57.1 percent in 2008 (Desilver, 2014). This was a key reason why Democrats lost so
many congressional seats (Montanaro, “Voter Turnout”, 2018).
One question studied by survey researchers is how Americans were engaged with politics
on social media in 2010. Their findings are complicated. On the one hand, only a small minority
– 22 percent – of adult Internet users used social networking sites to follow the 2010 midterms
(Smith, 2011). Additionally, only eight percent of adult Internet users posted political content on
a social networking site, seven percent followed a candidate or political group, and seven percent
started or joined a political group on a social networking site (Smith, 2011). Two explanations
for these low numbers are voter apathy and the fact that millions of Americans were not yet on
social media. On the other hand, social media engagement was actually higher than in 2008 in a
couple of ways. For example, on Facebook, more than 12 million people used the “I voted
button” in 2010, whereas only 5.4 million had in 2008 (Calabrese, 2010).
One difference with the 2008 cycle is that there was less of a mismatch between how
much Democrats and Republicans used social media. Among social networking site users, 40
percent of Republicans and 38 percent of Democrats – a fairly insignificant difference – used
these sites to get involved politically (Smith, 2011). In addition, adult internet users who
followed the 2010 midterms on social media voted for Republican congressional candidates over
Democratic candidates by a 45 to 41 percent margin (Smith, 2011).
In fact, there is evidence that Republican candidates running for office were actually
more engaged on social media compared to their Democratic counterparts. According to a study
by the University of Michigan, Republicans tweeted an average of 723 times during the 2010
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campaign (Livne et al., 2011, p. 4). By contrast, Democrats tweeted an average of only 551 times
(Livne et al., 2011, p. 4).

2.3 2012 Election Cycle
Compared to 2010, Democrats fared much better in the 2012 cycle, even if they were
unable to retake the House of Representatives. Facing off against Republican nominee Mitt
Romney (R-UT), incumbent president Barack Obama (D-IL) won 332 electoral votes, and 51.1
percent of the vote (“Election 2012”, 2012). Romney received only 206 electoral votes, and 47.2
percent of the vote (“Election 2012”, 2012). Meanwhile, Democrats had a net gain of one seat in
the Senate and eight seats in the House of Representatives (“Election 2012”, 2012).
The 2012 cycle was also noteworthy because more politicians than ever before were on
social media. In January 2011, only 44 percent of the Senate and 35 percent of the House were
active on Twitter (“100 Senators”, 2013). By January 2013, those numbers had increased to 100
percent of the Senate and 90 percent, or 398 representatives, of the House (“100 Senators”,
2013). Moreover, there were 29 states with their entire delegation tweeting in January 2013
(“100 Senators”, 2013). Every state, without exception, had at least 70 percent of their delegation
tweeting (“100 Senators”, 2013).
One difference between the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections was the amount of
money spent on digital ads. Johnston (2015) claims that digital advertising spending increased by
251 percent between the two presidential elections. In fact, the Obama and Romney campaigns
“spent about $22 online for each vote they received” (Johnston, 2015). The amount spent on
digital advertising would only continue to grow in later election cycles, as social networking
sites grew more popular and campaigns increasingly recognized the importance of the Internet
(Johnston, 2015).
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Unlike in 2008, both presidential candidates were active on social media. As Bimber
(2014, p. 37-38) observes: “Where the McCain campaign had maintained a mass-media strategy
that had little room for digital media, the Romney campaign adopted the Obama approach of
integrating digital media tools into the core of the campaign.” In particular, the Romney
campaign had its own social media site, MyMitt, that included volunteer-management and
phone-from-home tools (Bimber, 2014, p. 138). Like the Obama campaign, Romney was also
active on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (Bimber, 2014, p. 138). Romney’s use of digital
media in 2012 “constitutes a verification of Vaccari’s (2010) observation from two years earlier
that the tools Obama employed in 2008 had “become commoditized and a routine part of the
context in which [election campaigns] are conducted” (Bimber, 2014, p. 138).
Another difference with 2008 is that both presidential campaigns focused much more on
data analytics. As Bimber (2014, p. 131) explains: “In the context of lowered voter turnout and
dissipated enthusiasm, the Obama campaign exploited data analytics to engage in an
unprecedented level of personalized message targeting in a handful of states, in order to win a
closer election with highly honed, state-by-state tactics.” In order to accomplish this
microtargeting, the Obama campaign acquired data from people’s social networks, using it to
model the likely behavior of citizens (Bimber, 2014, p. 140-41). The models were helpful for
“crafting messages and making tactical decisions about how to allocate resources” (Bimber,
2014, p. 141).
Similarly, the Romney campaign had a significant data analytics effort. Bimber (2014, p.
143) writes that it “apparently [surpassed] what had been done by any other Democratic or
Republican campaign prior to 2012.” Nevertheless, it fell “well behind” the Obama campaign’s
use of data analytics (Bimber, 2014, p. 143). Another difference is that the Romney campaign
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relied much more on outside analytics firms, whereas Obama “centralized his data analytic
efforts inside his campaign” (Bimber, 2014, p. 143). Some studies suggest that Romney’s digital
analytics campaign was also more “focused on [the] persuasion of undecided voters than on [the]
turnout of supporters” (Bimber, 2014, p. 143).
One similarity with 2008 is that once again, there was a mismatch in how many
individuals followed the two presidential candidates on social media. On Election Day 2012,
Obama had 33 million Facebook supporters, whereas Romney only had 12 million (Bimber,
2014, p. 138). On Twitter, the difference was even more stark. Obama had 22 million followers,
whereas Romney only had 1.7 million (Bimber, 2014, p. 138). As Bimber (2014, p. 138)
observes, some of this mismatch is due to incumbency, “since Obama had accumulated followers
and supporters while president.” However, a “considerable amount of the gap” was a result of
the 2012 campaign (Bimber, 2014, p. 138). In September 2011, Obama only had 10 million
followers on Twitter, so gained 12 million new followers during the 2012 cycle (Bimber, 2014,
p. 138). By comparison, Romney “acquired less than one-fifth of that number” during the 2012
cycle (Bimber, 2014, p. 138).
Following the 2012 presidential election, the Republican National Committee (RNC)
recognized that there was a digital divide between the two parties. In order to narrow the gap, the
RNC offered several recommendations as part of a post-election autopsy report. Specific
suggestions included hiring a chief technology and digital officer, expanding the RNC’s
technology and digital teams, and creating in-house staff training programs (“Growth and
Opportunity”, p. 22).
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2.4 2014 Election Cycle
Unfortunately for Democrats, their party fared poorly in the 2014 midterm elections, just
as it had in 2010. The Democratic Party suffered a net loss of nine seats in the Senate and 13
seats in the House of Representatives (Blake, 2014). As a result, the GOP, which had already
controlled the House since January 2011, assumed a majority that was larger than at any point
since the Great Depression (Blake, 2014). In addition, Democrats lost control of the Senate
(Blake, 2014). A second similarity with the 2010 midterms was low voter turnout. A record low
36.7 percent of the voting-age population cast ballots, the lowest percentage in 70 years
(Montanaro, “Voter Turnout”, 2018). Like in 2010, low turnout was a key reason why
Democrats fared so poorly (Montanaro, “Voter Turnout”, 2018).
However, the parallels between the 2010 and 2014 midterms do not extend to the use of
social media. One difference between the two cycles is that more people followed politicians on
social media. In 2010, only six percent of registered voters followed candidates or other political
figures on social media (Smith, 2014). By 2014, the number was up to 16 percent (Smith, 2014).
However, it is possible that this discrepancy is simply due to more people using social media. A
second difference between the two cycles is that digital advertising increased a staggering 1,825
percent between the 2010 and 2014 midterm elections (Johnston, 2015). In fact, digital
advertising was higher than that of 2012 by over $100 million, despite the 2014 midterms having
lower turn-out (Johnston, 2015).
Between 2010 and 2014, there were also significant changes in mobile phone use. In
2010, only 13 percent of registered voters used their cell phones to track political news or
campaign coverage (Smith, 2014). In 2014, the same was true of 28 percent of registered voters
(Smith, 2014). One key reason is that cellphone and smartphone accessibility increased between
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the two midterm elections. Between 2010 and 2014, the percentage of Americans who had a cell
phone increased from 85 percent to 90 percent (Soergel, 2014). The percentage of Americans
owning a smartphone increased from 35 percent in 2011 to 58 percent in 2014 (Soergel, 2014).

2.5 2016 Election Cycle
In the 2016 presidential election, Republican nominee Donald Trump (R-NY) won an
upset victory over Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton (D-NY). Trump received 304 electoral
votes whereas Clinton only received 227 (“2016 Presidential Election”). This outcome occurred
despite the fact that Clinton won the popular vote 48.2 percent to 46.1 percent (“2016
Presidential Election”). Politico described Trump’s victory as “the biggest upset in U.S. history”,
as Clinton had “led national polls and in most battleground states heading into the election”
(Goldmacher & Schrecinger, 2016). Meanwhile, Democrats only had a net gain of two seats in
the Senate and six seats in the House, meaning that Republicans maintained control of Congress
(“Congress elections, 2016”).
In the 2016 election, social media was used more as a news source than ever before.
According to Shearer (2016), about a quarter of U.S. adults received their campaign news from
the social media posts of the Clinton and Trump campaigns. By comparison, only 10 percent
received news from the candidates’ website and only nine percent received it from their emails
(Shearer, 2016). In particular, younger voters disproportionately received their news online
(Echelon Insights, 2016). According to one study by Echelon Insights (2016), social media was
the primary way Americans aged 18-49 found news online, at 33 percent. Social media was
followed by search at 23 percent, visiting a news organization’s website at 17 percent, and email
at 7 percent (Echelon Insights, 2016).

Ausubel 25
More so than previous election cycles, 2016 also demonstrated how social media could
be used to create narratives around candidates. Two candidates in particular benefited: Bernie
Sanders and Donald Trump. Sanders was portrayed by his supporters as “static, unchanging, and
thus unyielding” (Kolehmainen, 2017). Parody twitter accounts, such as @BernieWanCanobi
and @PoliticoPotter, also added a layer of mythos to the Senator. As Kolehmainen (2017)
discusses: “In both cases, Sanders was depicted as the mentor character (Obi-Wan Kenobi or
Dumbledore), a hero-maker archetype whose primary function was to guide and empower the
actual hero of the tale - who, in this instance, were his supporters.” Meanwhile, Donald Trump
was portrayed - both in his Twitter feed and by his supporters - as an “alpha male”
(Kolehmainen, 2017) and an “authentic outsider” (Enli, 2017, p. 58). His “amateurish yet
authentic style” in social media, especially when contrasted with Clinton’s professional,
carefully managed image, helped reinforce this narrative (Enli, 2017, p. 50). By contrast, one
major candidate, Hillary Clinton, was hurt by a social media narrative: the idea that she was
dishonest. In particular, one video titled “Hillary Clinton lying for 13 minutes straight”
emphasized changes in Clinton’s political stances over time (Kolehmainen, 2017). Donald
Trump’s nickname for Clinton, “Crooked Hillary”, also fed into this narrative and even cast her
into the role of a villain (Kolehmainen, 2017).
More importantly to this paper, two major controversies impacted the 2016 election, each
with lasting implications. Over the past three years, both stories have received countless
headlines and continue to influence both parties’ social media strategies.
The first is the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal. In 2014, Aleksandr Kogan,
a data scientist at Cambridge University, developed a survey app called “This Is Your Digital
Life” (Hern & Cadwalladr, 2018). Even though less than 300,000 Facebook users took the
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survey, the data of people in their social networks were also collected (Albright, 2018).
Consequently, data on as many as 87 million Facebook profiles may have been collected in what
was later described by the New York Times as one of the largest data leaks in the social network’s
history (Kang & Frenzel, 2018; Rosenberg et al, 2018). In 2015, Kagan shared the data with
Cambridge Analytica, a voter-profiling company, which then used 30 million of those profiles to
“construct psychological profiles of voters” (Albright, 2018). By looking at a voter’s Facebook
profile, Cambridge Analytica wanted to know if a particular voter was, say, “a neurotic introvert,
a religious extrovert, a fair-minded liberal, or a fan of the occult” (Friedman & Bromwich, 2018;
Rosenberg et al., 2018). That way, the Trump 2016 could more effectively micro-target voters
with messages (Rosenberg et al., 2018).
The second controversy is how Russia meddled in the 2016 presidential election. For
example, the Internet Research Agency, a Russian group, launched a disinformation campaign in
which they “disseminated inflammatory posts” on social media (Isaac & Wabayashi, 2017).
Their posts reached 126 million users on Facebook, which is nearly as many people as voted in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Isaac & Wabayashi, 2017). In addition, Russian agents
published more than 131,000 messages on Twitter and uploaded over 1,000 videos to Google’s
YouTube service (Isaac & Wabayashi, 2017). Remarkably, the Internet Research Agency did not
spend a huge amount; they only had a monthly budget of $1.2 million (Clark, 2018).
Nevertheless, their posts were able to reach over a hundred million users, demonstrating the
potential of social media for low-cost but effective advertising.
By interfering in American politics, Vladimir Putin’s government sought to “undermine
public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate [Hillary] Clinton, and harm her electability
and potential presidency” (U.S. Intelligence Community, 2017). However, it remains hotly
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debated to this day whether Russia was ultimately responsible for Donald Trump’s narrow
victory in the 2016 American presidential election. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, the director of the
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania, believes the answer is yes.
Her reasoning is that while Russians did not tamper with voting machines, they persuaded many
people through their disinformation campaign to either vote for Trump or to sit out the
presidential election (Mayer, 2018). Other experts are either less convinced than Jamieson,
instead focusing on “Clinton’s weak performance as a candidate and […] her campaign’s tactical
errors” (Mayer, 2018). Regardless, the Russia story is relevant because it illustrates how the two
parties, especially the Democrats, need to be wary of bots and foreign interference on social
media going forward.
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3 Existing Literature on the 2018 Midterms
Chapter 3 describes the existing literature on the 2018 midterms, beginning with a
general overview and then discussing what issues candidates emphasized on social media.
Without this section, it would be difficult to interpret the results from Chapter 4, when House
candidates’ Twitter posts are analyzed, or understand why they are important.

3.1 Overview
In the 2018 midterm elections, the Democratic Party had a net loss of two seats in the
Senate but a net gain of 40 seats in the House of Representatives (“2018 Midterm Election
Results”, 2018). On balance, these were excellent results for Democrats, even if the party was
only able to reclaim the House. Democrats won the House by a margin of nearly 10 million
votes, or 8.6 percent, the largest margin ever in a midterm election cycle (Enten, 2018). Enten
(2018) went so far as to describe the House results as not simply a “blue wave” but as a
“tsunami.”
Importantly, Democrats’ retaking of the House was not a forgone conclusion, as they had
to overcome a number of structural barriers, including gerrymandering. As Phillips (2018) noted:
“Republicans swept into control of state legislatures in 2010 in time to take charge of drawing
electoral districts after the 2010 Census. Democrats [were subsequently] locked out of power in
the House.” A second barrier was partisan self-sorting. As Phillips (2018) explained:
“Democratic-leaning voters cluster in cities, while conservative voters spread out in rural areas
across the rest of the state. The result is that Democrats’ votes are essentially diluted by living in
areas that would vote for a Democrat for Congress anyway.” Due to these two structural factors,
Democrats had to win the popular vote by as much as seven to 11 percentage points in order to
gain even a simple majority in the House (Phillips, 2018).
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Even the Senate results, which disappointed many Democrats, are more impressive than
they might seem at first glance. Of the 33 Senate seats up for reelection, 24 of them were held by
Democrats (Kilgore, 2018). Ten of the Democrats ran for reelection in states carried by Donald
Trump in 2016, whereas only one Republican ran for reelection in a state carried by Hillary
Clinton (Kilgore, 2018). Most dauntingly for Democrats, five of their Senate candidates ran for
reelection in states that Trump won by 18 points or more (Prokop, “Democrats’ prospects”,
2017).
Clearly, though, Democrats had some factors in their favor, given how they ultimately
performed. First, the president’s party typically loses House seats in midterm elections. The
mean result for a president’s party in postwar midterms is a loss of 25 seats, while the median
result is a loss of 22 seats (Prokop, “Democrats’ prospects”, 2018). Depending on someone’s
interpretation, Democrats’ 2018 performance is either consistent with this historical trend or far
exceeded it. Second, the Democratic base was highly energized during the 2018 midterms, which
“[contributed] to [the] recruitment of strong candidates, fundraising, and turnout” (Prokop,
“Democrats’ prospects”, 2018). Third, as already discussed, Donald Trump’s approval rating
was underwater. Low approval rating is associated with poor midterm performance (Prokop,
“Democrats’ prospects”, 2018).
Between 2014 and 2018, digital advertising skyrocketed. In the 2014 midterms,
advertisers only spent about $250 million on digital ads (Lynch, 2018). By comparison, about
$950 million was spent in the 2018 midterms (Lynch, 2018). These statistics illustrate how
campaigns increasingly used the Internet for voter outreach. However, it is also worth putting the
last number in context. In 2018, $5.25 billion was spent on total advertising, meaning that only a
fraction of the ads were online (Lynch, 2018).
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3.2 Major Issues
Seven key issues that were salient during the 2018 midterms are as follows: the economy,
gun policy, healthcare, immigration, Russia, the Supreme Court, and the Trump presidency. This
section provides background information – including public opinion and historical context – on
each of these seven issues. The existing literature provides overwhelming evidence of mass
polarization. On almost every issue discussed, Democratic and Republican voters held radically
different views in 2018 (i.e. mass polarization). For example, Democrats believed much more in
government intervention in areas such as gun policy and healthcare, whereas Republicans did
not. In addition, there was a partisan split on how salient issues were. Democrats clearly cared
more about some issues, such as the need for affordable healthcare. Republicans cared more
about others, such as border security. However, it remains an open question whether Democratic
and Republican politicians also held divergent views and an intensity gap on the same seven
issue areas (i.e. elite polarization). These questions are later considered in Chapter 4, in which
the Twitter posts of 2018 House candidates are analyzed.
3.2.1 Economy
3.2.1.1 Public Opinion
In the 2018 midterms, the economy was less of a top issue compared to previous midterm
elections. According to Gallup, 94 percent of voters said that the economy would be
extremely/very important to their vote in 2010 (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). In 2014, a still
very high number, 88 percent, made that claim (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). By comparison,
only 78 percent of voters said that the economy would extremely/very important to their vote
(Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). In fact, only 13 percent of Americans – close to a record low –
said in October 2018 that the economy was the nation’s most important issue (Newport, “Top

Ausubel 31
Issues”, 2018). Newport (“Top Issues”, 2018) speculates that the deemphasis of this issue was
due to a relatively prosperous American economy, with low unemployment and relatively strong
GDP growth. Davidson and Shell (2018) concur, claiming that the average person was “pretty
happy” about the economy and so focused on other political issues.
Another finding is that Democratic and Republican voters placed more importance on
different economic issues. For example, the Gallup poll suggests that Democrats cared more
about income inequality. 82 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters, but only 52
percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters, said that the “way income wealth are
distributed in U.S. society” would be extremely/very important to their vote (Newport, “Top
Issues”, 2018). By contrast, Republicans cared more about taxes. 76 percent of Republican and
Republican-leaning voters, but only 64 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters,
said that taxes would be extremely/very important to their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018).
3.2.1.2 Major News Stories
Tariffs: On the 2016 campaign trail, Donald Trump was an outspoken critic of American
trade policy. He promised to “fix our terrible trade deals”, which he saw as benefitting other
countries’ exports to the United States and hurting American exports to other countries
(Davidson, 2018). He also said he would label China a currency manipulator and “impose
punitive tariffs on Chinese goods” (Corasaniti et al, 2016). Trump framed his race with Hillary
Clinton as a choice between nationalism and the policies of “a leadership class that worships
globalism” (Corasaniti et al., 2016). True to his word, Trump subsequently imposed a series of
tariffs during his presidency, especially against China (Gonzales, 2018).
Trump tax cuts: In December 2017, President Trump signed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017). This was the biggest tax overhaul in over 30 years, “[slashing]
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the corporate and individual income rates, [eliminating] numerous deductions, and [setting] up a
new system for international taxation” (Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017). The Trump
administration outlined four goals of the TCJA: tax relief for middle class Americans,
simplifying the tax code, growing the American economy, and not adding to the debt or deficit
(“Donald J. Trump’s Tax Plan”).
From the very beginning, the TCJA was controversial. One critique Democrats raised is
that the law would cost an estimated $1.5 trillion over a decade (Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017).
A second critique is that some groups benefited more than others from the TCJA, such as
corporations and the wealthy (Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017). A third argument against the tax
law is that it eliminated the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that individuals buy health insurance
or pay a fine (Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017). According to the Congressional Budget Office, 13
million more Americans will be “uninsured in a decade because of Republicans’ decision to
eliminate the individual mandate (Soffen & Fischer-Baum, 2017).
3.2.2 Gun Policy
3.2.2.1 Public Opinion
Besides the economy, gun policy was another salient issue area in the 2018 midterms.
According to a Gallup poll, 72 percent of voters said that gun policy would be extremely/very
important their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). When broken down by partisanship, the
results show a small but significant intensity gap. 76 percent of Democratic and Democraticleaning voters, but only 68 percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters, said that gun
policy would be extremely/very important to their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018).
Democratic and Republican voters held radically different views on guns. For example,
51 percent of Democrats said there would be more crime if more Americans had guns, whereas
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56 percent of Republicans said the opposite (Oliphant, 2017). Nearly two-thirds of Democrats
said there would be fewer mass shootings if it was harder for people to legally obtain guns; only
about a quarter of Republicans agreed (Oliphant, 2017). In particular, Democrats and
Republicans held polarized views on the National Rifle Association (NRA). According to a poll
by the Pew Research Center, 60 percent of Democratic gun owners and 67 percent of nonowners said that that the NRA has too much influence (Igielnik & Brown, 2017). By contrast, 67
percent of Republican gun owners and 62 percent of non-owners said that it has the right amount
of influence (Igielnik & Brown, 2017).
3.2.2.1 Major News Stories
Parkland: On February 14th 2018, a gunman named Nikolas Cruz opened fire at Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, killing 17 people in what would be the
deadliest high school shooting in U.S. history (Hampson, 2018). Almost immediately, there were
calls for more gun control. “We are going to be the last mass shooting,” Emma Gonzalez, a
Parkland student, vowed in a speech that went viral. “We are going to change the law”
(Hampson, 2018). True to their word, the Parkland survivors, including Gonzalez, then turned to
social activism, including holding a well-publicized march in Washington, DC (Andone, 2019).
In 2018, gun control activists were unusually successful in passing legislation, one reason
being the Parkland activists. According to a year-end report by the Giffords Law Center, 67 new
gun laws were “enacted by both Republican and Democratic legislators in 26 states and
Washington, DC” (“Trend Watch”, 2018). One caveat, though, is that the NRA also had some
successes. 203 “anti-gun” bills failed or were defeated in 2018, and seven more were vetoed by
governors (Andone, 2019). In addition, the NRA claimed that 26 “pro-gun” laws were enacted at
the state level in 2018 (Andone, 2019).
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3.2.3 Healthcare
3.2.3.1 Public Opinion
Healthcare was an important, if not the key, issue area in the 2018 midterms. According
to a Gallup poll, 80 percent of respondents said that healthcare would be extremely/very
important to their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). When results were broken down by
partisanship, the results reveal an unmistakable intensity gap. 87 percent of Democratic and
Democratic-leaning voters, but only 72 percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters,
said that healthcare would be extremely/very important to their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”,
2018).
Democrats and Republicans held very different opinions about healthcare. According to a
poll by the Pew Research Center, 85 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters said
that the federal government should be responsible for ensuring health coverage (Kiley, 2018). By
contrast, 68 percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters said that it should not (Kiley,
2018). With that being said, though, a majority of Republicans (55 percent) believed that the
government should continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid (Kiley, 2018). Only 10
percent of Republicans said that the government should not be involved in providing health
insurance at all (Kiley, 2018).
3.2.3.2 Major News Stories
Affordable Care Act: In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, also known as Obamacare or the ACA. The ACA was the largest overhaul of the US
healthcare system since the 1960s, designed to “extend health insurance to the estimated 15
percent of Americans who lacked it” (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018) The ACA also
aimed to slow the growth of U.S. healthcare spending (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018).
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From the very beginning, the Affordable Care Act was controversial. Republicans
claimed the bill was an “unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of private businesses and
individuals” and voted dozens of times to repeal it (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018).
However, despite controlling all three branches of government, Republicans failed to repeal the
ACA in 2017 (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018). By comparison, Democrats painted the
ACA as a beneficial, but imperfect, reform to the American healthcare system and offered to
work with Republicans to improve it (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018). They also stressed
some of the ACA’s most popular provisions, such as how children could stay on their parents’
healthcare plans until age 26 and how no one with preexisting conditions could be denied
insurance (“Has Trump Managed To Kill”, 2018).
Democrats’ emphasis on healthcare: Last year, a team of researchers working for The
Atlantic studied political ads posted on Google between May 3 rd and October 29th 2018 (Lemee
& Graham, 2018). The team found that healthcare was the most common issue in Democratic
ads, but only the sixth most common issue in Republican ads (Lemee & Graham, 2018). Roughly
a quarter of Democratic ads mentioned healthcare, whereas it only appeared in seven percent of
Republican ads (Lemee & Graham, 2018). A separate report, by the group Protect Our Care,
found that fifty percent of Democratic spending on broadcast advertising was spent on healthcare
(“Defined by Health Care”). In September 2018 alone, more than 130,000 pro-Democratic ads
mentioned healthcare (“Defined by Health Care”). As the Twitter analysis in Chapter 4 will
show, these results are not surprising. In all sorts of media, including on Twitter, Democrats
talked a lot more than Republicans about healthcare.
Medicare and Medicaid: In 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson signed two programs, Medicare
and Medicaid, into law. Medicare provides hospital and medical insurance for Americans age 65
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or older, whereas Medicaid “offers health coverage to certain low-income people” (“Johnson
Signs”, 2019). Both programs were salient issues in the 2018 midterms, the most obvious reason
being that millions of Americans rely on them. In 2017, about 60 million people U.S. citizens
were enrolled in Medicare (“Overview of Medicare”, 2019) and nearly 74 million U.S. citizens
were enrolled in Medicaid (“Total Medicaid enrollment”, 2018). A second reason for the issue
saliency is that both programs, especially Medicare, are expensive. In 2017, Medicare
“accounted for 15 percent of total federal spending and 20 percent of total national health
spending” (“Overview of Medicare”, 2019). A third reason is that Democrats made Medicaid
expansion, which was established under the Affordable Care Act, a major focus of the 2018
midterms (“Medicaid Expansion”, 2018).
Rising health expenditures: As Rooney and Moyer (2018) observe, healthcare costs have
“gone through the roof and are now the highest [they have] ever been for the American
economy, companies, and individuals.” For example, health expenditures used to be only five
percent of GDP in 1960 but were 18.2 percent of GDP in 2018 (Rooney & Moyer, 2018).
Despite spending twice as much as any other high-income country in the world on medical care,
though, the United States has similar utilization rates to comparable countries (Rooney & Moyer,
2018).
Pre-existing conditions: The Affordable Care Act may be divisive, but its protections for
people with pre-existing conditions are broadly popular. According to one survey, more than
seven in 10 of Americans said it is important to retain the ACA provisions that “prevent
insurance companies from denying coverage based on a person’s medical history” and from
“charging sick people more” (Singh & Lee, 2018).
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Politicians of both parties actively campaigned in favor of protecting pre-existing
conditions. However, Democrats accused their opponents of hypocrisy, arguing that the
Republican Party’s “repeated attempts to repeal the Affordable Care Act would have undermined
protections for sicker Americans” (Bryan, 2018). By contrast, Republicans claimed that they
wanted to protect pre-existing conditions, despite opposing the Affordable Care Act, while also
providing more choices for consumers (Bryan, 2018).
3.2.4 Immigration
3.2.4.1 Public Opinion
A fourth important issue area was immigration. According to a Gallup poll from October
2018, 78 percent of respondents said that immigration would be extremely/very important to
their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). When the results were broken down by partisanship,
the percentages were 74 percent for Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters, and 84 percent
for Republican and Republican-leaning voters (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018).
Democrats and Republicans viewed the issue of immigration very differently, even if
they agreed on its importance. According to a poll by the Pew Research Center, 75 percent of
Republicans, but only 19 percent of Democrats, regarded illegal immigration as a very big
problem (“Little Partisan Agreement”, 2018). By contrast, 57 percent of Democrats, but only 15
percent of Republicans, said that the way immigrants who are in the country illegally are treated
is a very big problem (“Little Partisan Agreement”, 2018).
3.2.4.2 Major News Stories
DACA: In June 2012, the Obama administration created a program called Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA for short (Gonzalez, 2017). DACA allowed young
people brought into the United States illegally by their parents “to get a temporary reprieve from
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deportation and to receive permission to work, study, and obtain driver’s licenses” (Gonzalez,
2017). In order to be eligible, DACA applicants have to meet a number of criteria, including
being younger than 31 when the program began and having a clean criminal record (Gonzalez,
2017).
There are far more undocumented immigrants residing in the United States – about 11.3
million – than DACA recipients. Of the 11.3 million, about 3.6 million undocumented
immigrants entered the United States before their 18th birthday (Gomez, 2018). This group is
commonly referred to as DREAMers (Gomez, 2018). An even smaller group, consisting of 1.8
million immigrants, entered the United States before their 16th birthday and so is eligible to apply
for DACA (Gomez, 2018). The smallest group, consisting of 800,000 immigrants, consists of
DREAMers who actually received DACA protections (Gomez, 2018). Most DACA recipients
are from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Gonzalez, 2017). There are also
several thousand immigrants from Asian countries such as South Korea and the Philippines
(Gonzalez, 2017). DACA recipients live in every state, but the largest concentrations are in
California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida (Gonzalez, 2017).
In September 2017, the Trump administration announced that it would end the DACA
program in six months if Congress did not “find a more permanent solution” (Gonzalez, 2017).
However, Trump also signaled in a tweet that he supported legalizing DACA and that he would
“revisit the issue if Congress [could not] legalize the program” (Gonzalez, 2017). In the six
months that followed, Congress considered various immigration bills but failed to pass any,
putting the DREAMERs’ fate in limbo (Nowicki & Gonzalez, 2018).
Family separation: In April 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced a “zero
tolerance” policy on illegal crossings at the US-Mexico border (John & Epstein, 2018). As John

Ausubel 39
and Epstein (2018) explain: “Under this policy, adults caught at the border [were referred] to the
Department of Justice for prosecution. Any children accompanying those adults [were treated] as
unaccompanied minors and temporarily placed in detention centers run by the Department of
Homeland Security.” Because of this policy, 1,995 children were separated from their parents at
the US-Mexico border between mid-April and May 31st (John & Epstein, 2018). Another
consequence is that immigration became much more salient of an issue. According to Gallup,
only 14 percent of Americans saw immigration as the nation’s top issue in June (Newport,
“Immigration Surges”, 2018). In July, by contrast, a much larger share, 22 percent, saw it as the
nation’s top issue after family separation received extensive media coverage (Newport,
“Immigration Surges”, 2018).
The Trump administration sent mixed messages about its policy. Some individuals, such
as Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, falsely claimed that family separation was a
“continuation of previous administrations’ policies of separating children if the adult has broken
a law” (Rhodan, 2018). Others, such as White House senior policy advisor Stephen Miller,
directly defended the policy. “[Family separation] was a simple decision by the administration to
have a zero-tolerance policy for illegal entry, period,” he told The New York Times (Rhodan,
2018). “The message is that no one is exempt from immigration law” (Rhodan, 2018). By
contrast, critics from both political parties described the policy as cruel and antithetical to
American values (John & Epstein, 2018).
Ultimately, Trump caved to pressure from his critics. On June 20 th, he signed an
executive order “meant to end the separation of families at the border by detaining parents and
children together for an indefinite period” (Shear et al., 2018). “We’re going to have strong –
very strong – borders, but we are going to keep the families together,” Trump said as he signed
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the executive order (Shear et al., 2018). “I didn’t like the sight or the feeling of families being
separated” (Shear et al, 2018).
Trump’s wall: During his announcement speech in June 2015, Donald Trump called for a
wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. “I will build a great, great wall on our southern border,” the
then presidential candidate proclaimed (Trump, 2015). “And I will have Mexico pay for [it]”
(“Announcement Speech”, 2015). From the very beginning, the idea of Trump’s border wall was
divisive. According to a 2015 poll by the Pew Research Center, 73 percent of Republicans but
only 29 percent of Democrats agreed that the wall should be built (Sakuma, 2015). Subsequently,
Democratic resistance to the idea hardened. A 2018 Gallup poll found that 73 percent of
Republicans but only 13 percent of Democrats supported “significantly expanding the
construction of walls along the U.S.-Mexico border” (Newport, “Border Walls”, 2018).
To date, Trump’s proposed border wall remains unbuilt. However, it is worth noting that
man-made barriers already cover about a third of the U.S.-Mexico border. As Shoichet & Sands
(2019) explain, the border stretches for 1,954 miles and physical barriers cover 654 of those
miles. More specifically, vehicle fencing covers 280 miles while pedestrian fencing covers 374
miles (Shoichet & Sands, 2019).
3.2.5 Russia
3.2.5.1 The Mueller Investigation
In May 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed Robert Mueller as
special counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice (Lawler, 2017). Since then, Mueller’s team
has investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election as well as “any links or coordination
between Russia and Trump campaign-linked individuals” (“What is Robert Mueller doing”,
2019). Mueller’s probe expanded in June 2017 to investigate Trump for potential obstruction of
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justice (Lawler, 2017). So far, Mueller’s team has “[netted] 199 criminal charges, 37 indictments
or guilty pleas, and five prison sentences” (Lawler, 2017). The list of prosecuted individuals
includes several Trump associates who “had Russia-related contacts during the 2016 presidential
campaign and transition period”, including George Padadopoulos, Paul Manafort, Rick Gates,
and Michael Flynn, Michael Cohen, and Roger Stone (“Where the investigations”, 2019; Prokop,
“Robert Mueller”, 2019).
3.2.5.2 Public Opinion
Few issues were more polarizing than Russia in 2018. According to a Gallup poll, 45
percent of voters said that the investigation into Russian involvement in the 2016 U.S. election
would be extremely/very important to their vote (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). However, when
results were broken down by partisanship, the percentages were 66 percent of Democratic and
Democratic-leaning voters, but only 19 percent for Republicans of Republican and Republicanleaning voters (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). In addition, a majority of Americans believed that
Russia interfered on behalf of Trump, according to an Ipsos/Reuters poll (Kirby, 2018). 34
percent strongly agreed with that claim, while another 22 percent somewhat agreed (Kirby,
2018). Broken down further, the results have an unmistakably partisan bent. 58 percent of
Democrats strongly agreed that Russia interfered to help Trump and 23 percent somewhat agreed
(Kirby, 2018). By contrast, 31 percent of Republicans strongly disagreed and 19 percent
somewhat disagreed (Kirby, 2018). In fact, 40 percent of Republicans said that the Justice
Department should “immediately end the special counsel’s investigation into Russian meddling”,
compared to only 11 percent of Democrats (Kirby, 2018).
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3.2.6 Supreme Court
3.2.6.1 Brett Kavanaugh’s Nomination to the Supreme Court
On June 27th, 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedy sent shockwaves through the country when
he announced his retirement from the Supreme Court (Shear, 2018). Kennedy had been a swing
vote on the court for nearly three decades and so his replacement by a more conservative justice
had the potential to shift the Supreme Court to the right for years to come, if not decades (Shear,
2018). A few days later, on July 9th, President Trump nominated Brett Kavanaugh, a judge on the
D.C. Court of Appeals, to be Kennedy’s successor (Shear, 2018). Given how much was at stake,
the confirmation process threatened to be vicious. “I will oppose Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination
with everything I have,” vowed Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the Senate Minority Leader (Shear,
2018).
The story became even messier in September, when Christine Blasey Ford, a research
psychologist, went public with sexual assault allegations against Kavanaugh (Stolberg & Fandos,
2018). Thirty years earlier, a drunk Kavanaugh had allegedly “pinned her to a bed and had tried
to rip off her clothes” (Stolberg & Fandos, 2018). Democrats tended to side with Ford, saying
that her allegations were credible and that Kavanaugh was unfit to serve on the Supreme Court
(Stolberg & Fandos, 2018). In contrast, Republicans argued that Ford’s allegations were
unproven and that Democrats’ attacks on Kavanaugh were politically motivated (Stolberg &
Fandos, 2018). In fact, the nominee himself went as far as to call the allegations as an
“embarrassment” and the movement against him “revenge on behalf of the Clintons”
(Montanaro, “More Believe Ford”, 2018).
Ultimately, Kavanaugh was confirmed to the Supreme Court 50 to 48 in one of the
narrowest margins in American history (Stolberg, 2018). President Trump was ecstatic about the
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news. “He’s going to go down as a totally brilliant Supreme Court justice for many years,” he
boasted to reporters (Stolberg, 2018). By contrast, Ford’s supporters were dispirited, feeling that
“their elected representatives [had] not heard their voices” (Stolberg, 2018). In addition, the
nomination process “challenged Americans’ faith in the Supreme Court as an institution that is
above politics” (Stolberg, 2018).
3.2.6.2 Public Opinion
Views of Kavanaugh’s nomination were highly polarized. According to a Marist poll, 41
percent of respondents supported Kavanaugh’s nomination to the Supreme Court, while 48
percent opposed it (“Marist Poll”, 2018). Delving deeper into the data, only five percent of
Democrats supported Kavanaugh’s nomination, while 83 percent opposed it (“Marist Poll”,
2018). In contrast, 88 percent of Republicans supported the nomination, while eight percent
opposed it (“Marist Poll”, 2018). Independents were more evenly split; 42 percent supported
Kavanaugh’s nomination, while 49 percent opposed it (“Marist Poll”, 2018).
In addition, Democrats and Republicans held radically different views on the sexual
assault allegations against Kavanaugh. According to the Marist poll, 45 percent of respondents
said that Ford was the one telling the truth, while 33 percent said Kavanaugh was the one telling
the truth (“Marist Poll”, 2018). However, when the results were broken down further, 80 percent
of Democratic men and 74 percent of Democratic women believed Ford, whereas 77 percent of
Republican men and 73 percent of Republican men believed Kavanaugh (“Marist Poll”, 2018).
3.2.7 The Trump Presidency
3.2.7.1 Public Opinion
In the months leading up to the 2018 midterms, Donald Trump was an unusually divisive
president. According to a poll by the Pew Research Center, 38 percent approved of his job
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performance, whereas 55 percent disapproved (“Trump Gets Negative Ratings”, 2018). When
results were broken down further, 90 percent of Democratic and Democratic-leaning voters
disapproved of Trump’s job performance, while only seven percent approved (“Trump Gets
Negative Ratings”, 2018). Conversely, 79 percent of Republican and Republican-leaning voters
approved while 14 percent disapproved (“Trump Gets Negative Ratings”, 2018). In fact, no
president in modern American history has had a larger gap in partisan approval rating than
Trump (Tyson, 2018).
Another Pew study provides evidence that the 2018 midterms were partially a referendum
on Trump’s job performance. The study found that 34 percent of registered voters thought of
their vote as against President Trump, while 26 percent thought of it as for the president (Scott,
2018). In particular, 61 percent of Democratic voters said their vote would be a vote against
Trump (Scott, 2018). This was noticeably higher than the percentage of Republican voters who
said their vote was a vote against Obama in 2010 or 2014 (Scott, 2018).

3.3 Concluding Remarks
The existing literature on the 2018 midterms provides several insights. First, Democratic
and Republican voters were divided on almost every major issue in the 2018 midterms, evidence
of mass polarization. Second, there was a partisan intensity gap on several issues, most notably
healthcare. Third, the mainstream media clearly thought that all seven issue areas were
important, given the countless articles written on each topic.
However, several questions remain unanswered. First, were Democratic and Republican
politicians just as divided on all of these issues (i.e. elite polarization) as voters were (i.e. mass
polarization)? Second, did elites show a partisan intensity gap in how much they prioritized
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issues? Third, were the issues seen as most important by the mainstream media also important to
politicians’ messaging? These questions will be the focus of the next section.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
Chapter 4 is a quantitative analysis of nearly 700 House candidates’ Twitter posts, using
the statistical coding language R as the tool to conduct the study. The objective of the analysis
was to see how often certain key terms came up and under what context. The data provides
overwhelming evidence that Democratic and Republican politicians emphasized different issues
on social media and framed them in distinct ways. Partisan differences in Twitter use can
potentially be explained by two factors: (a) political polarization, and (b) how the two parties
were confronted with unique challenges.
This chapter builds upon Section 3.2 by analyzing the same seven issue areas (i.e. the
economy, gun policy, healthcare, immigration, Russia, the Supreme Court, and the Trump
presidency). However, the focus is on elite polarization instead of mass polarization. This dataset
is also appropriate because Twitter is a major social networking site, used by millions of
Americans as well as most congressional candidates. Whereas many other sites more popular
(e.g. Facebook), it is much easier to scrape textual data from Twitter, making it a more valuable
resource for this project.

4.1 Overview of the Data
For this analysis to be possible, three different datasets needed to be merged together: (a)
Twitter data from between January 1 st and November 6th 2018, (b) a dataset supplied by the
website Ballotpedia, and (c) the Cook Political Report’s Cook Partisan Voter Index (CVI).
The first data set consists of the Twitter posts of 697 House candidates who ran in the
2018 general election. Independents and third-party candidates were excluded from the sample
because they rarely win elections in single-member districts. The sample also only includes
personal, not official/government, Twitter accounts. This restriction is made because official
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accounts are subject to federal law and House rules and regulations (Woods, 2014). More
specifically, content on official accounts is not supposed to include “personal… or campaign
information” nor “grassroots lobbying or solicit support for a member’s position” (Woods,
2014). Overall, the sample includes about 82 percent (697 of 855) of major-party House
candidates who ran in the 2018 general election.
In order to obtain the data, the author had to scrape the Twitter accounts of all 697
accounts the day after the election was over. Several steps went into the text mining process.
First, he had to create a Twitter developer app in order to scrape text from the website. Second,
he used the ‘get_timeline’ function in R to get each Twitter user’s 3,200 most tweets. Third, he
merged the data from all 697 accounts together. Step four was to clean the data, including
removing all tweets from before January 1 st 2018 and after November 6th 2018.
The second dataset was supplied by the website Ballotpedia. For context, Ballotpedia is a
nonpartisan political encyclopedia, founded in 2007, that covers American federal, state, and
local politics. This dataset included each congressional candidate’s name, party affiliation,
incumbency status, district, primary election date, and Twitter handle.
The third dataset is the Cook Political Report’s Cook Partisan Voter Index (PVI). The
Cook PVI is a measure of how each congressional district performed at the presidential level
compared to the nation as a whole in 2012 and 2016. For example, a PVI of D+2 indicates that in
the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, that district “performed an average of two points more
Democratic than the nation did as a whole” (Wasserman & Flinn, 2017).

4.2 Basic Summary Statistics
The Twitter dataset is very large, consisting of 403,508 tweets. Given that there are 697
candidates in the sample, this means that the average candidate sent 579 tweets between January
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1st and November 6th 2018. However, the median number of tweets sent by a candidate was only
304. The large difference between the mean and median can be explained by how some
candidates tweeted an unusually large number of times, skewing results.
Of the 403,508 tweets, 118,038 are retweets from other accounts, whereas 285,470 are
new tweets. When excluding tweets originally from other accounts, the average tweet received
258 likes and 98 retweets. However, the median tweet only received 13 likes and five retweets.
These results provide further evidence that the dataset is skewed.
Delving deeper, the dataset shows striking partisan differences in how much candidates
tweeted. Overall, 384 of the candidates in the sample (55 percent) are Democrats, whereas 313
(45 percent) are Republicans. However, the data also show that Democratic candidates tweeted
much more often than Republican candidates. 295,519 of the tweets (73 percent) in the dataset
were sent by Democrats, whereas only 107,989 (27 percent) were sent by Republicans. In
addition, the median Democrat tweeted 560.5 times between January 1st and November 6th,
whereas the median Republican only tweeted 175 times. Both findings suggest that Democratic
politicians were more energized on social media compared to their Republican counterparts.
To further illustrate the skew in the Twitter data, two histograms were plotted, one for
Democrats and one for Republicans. The vertical dotted lines show the median number of tweets
sent by a Democrat and Republican respectively. As both graphs show, most candidates tweeted
fewer than 1,000 tweets between January 1 st and November 6th 2018. Only a few candidates
tweeted more than 2,000 times and they were clear outliers in the data.
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In at least three different ways, Democratic accounts received more engagement on social
media compared to Republican accounts. First, Democratic candidates had more followers. The
median Democrat had 3,811 followers, whereas the median Republican had only 1,912
followers. Second, Democrats’ posts received more likes, when excluding retweets from other
accounts. The median Democratic tweet received 18 likes, whereas the median Republican tweet
received only seven likes. Third, Democrats’ posts were retweeted more, when excluding tweets
originally from other accounts. The median Democratic post was retweeted seven times, whereas
the median Republican post was only retweeted two times. This evidence suggests Democratic
voters, not just politicians, may have been more energized on Twitter compared to their
Republican counterparts. However, given how the sample is limited and how it only includes
House candidates’ tweets, this claim is difficult to prove conclusively.

Ausubel 50
These results can be further broken down by incumbency status:

Number of
tweets
Mean
Median
Followers
Mean
Median
Likes*
Mean
Median
Retweets*
Mean
Median

Democratic
incumbent

Democratic
nonincumbent

Republican
incumbent

Republican
nonincumbent

392.6
164

978.7
729

239.3
114

459.9
267

20,579.6
2,941

14,689.6
4,450

9,427.9
2,436

5,441.1
1,071.5

898.7
13

184.0
19

134.3
8

72.9
6

323.8
4

63.9
7

56.2
3

33.5
2

This table provides two major insights. First, notice the huge differences between means
and medians. This discrepancy can be explained by some accounts having an unusually large
number of tweets and followers, and by some tweets receiving an unusually large number of
likes and retweets. The results provides further evidence that the dataset is very skewed. Second,
there were notable differences between incumbents and non-incumbents. The average
Democratic incumbent tweeted less often than the average Democratic nonincumbent but had
more followers. His or her posts also received more likes and retweets on average compared to
the average nonincumbent. The same is also true of Republican incumbents versus Republican
nonincumbents.
As election date approached, the overall number of tweets per day (by all candidates)
increased on average. This finding makes sense for two reasons. First, voter mobilization efforts
in general – not just on social media – tend to increase as an election approaches (“Party
Affiliation and Election Polls”, 2012). Second, some candidates did not declare their candidacies
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until part way into 2018 (“Filing deadlines”, 2018). Two time series models were used to show
the increase in tweeting over time, one for Democrats and one for Republicans.

Time Series Model 1: This model just looked at Democrats, with time and time squared as
the independent variables and number of tweets as the dependent variable. An increase of one
day is associated on average with a 2.670 increase1 in the number of tweets. The marginal effect
is found by taking the derivative of the linear regression (y = b0 + b1t + b2t2) with respect to time
and then plugging in the average time. This yields b1 + 2b2t.

1

b1 + 2b2t = -0.751+(2*0.011*mean(1:310))
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Time Series Model 2: This model just looked at Republicans, with time and time squared
as the independent variables and number of tweets as the dependent variable. By the same
method as before, an increase of one day is associated on average with a 1.636 increase2 in the
number of tweets.
Another question is whether there was a statistically significant relationship between the
partisan lean of a district and how much a Democrat or Republican tweeted. One hypothesis is
that candidates running in swing districts or districts favoring the other party would be expected
to tweet more than their peers. These candidates were less “safe” in the general election and so
arguably needed to do more voter outreach.
Since the dataset is so skewed, the natural log was taken of each candidate’s number of
tweets in order to have a distribution that is closer to a normal distribution. The log number of
tweets is shown in the histograms below. Note that the dotted lines show the median log number
of tweets sent by a Democrat and Republican respectively.

2

b1 + 2b2t = -1.785+(2*0.011*mean(1:310))
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Four ordinary least squares models were used to test the hypothesis that there is
statistically significant relationship between the partisan lean of a district and how much a
Democrat or Republican tweeted, with any p-value less than 0.05 being statistically significant.

OLS Model 1 (Democrats): This model looked at just Democrats, with Cook PVI as the
independent variable and the log number of tweets as the dependent variable. Model 1 found that
on average, a one-unit increase in the partisan lean of a district was associated with a 0.027 unit
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increase in the log number of tweets (p = 8.69e-09). Put more simply, Democrats running in
more conservative districts tweeted slightly more on average.
OLS Model 2 (Democrats): This model was similar to Model 1 but controlled for
incumbency status and region. Model 2 found that on average, incumbency was associated with a
1.806 unit decrease in the log number of tweets (p < 2e-16). In other words, Democratic nonincumbents tweeted much more than Democratic incumbents on average. However, neither the
partisan lean of a district (p = 0.0925) nor region was statistically significant in this model.
OLS Model 3 (Republicans): This model looked at just Republicans, with Cook PVI as
the independent variable and log number of tweets as the dependent variable. Model 3 found that
on average, a one-unit increase in the partisan lean of a district was associated with a 0.013 unit
decrease in the log number of tweets (p = 0.0187). Put more simply, Republicans running in
more liberal districts tweeted slightly more on average.
OLS Model 4 (Republicans): This model was similar to Model 3 but controlled for
incumbency status and region. Model 4 found that on average, incumbency was associated with a
0.935 unit decrease in the log number of tweets (p = 1.08e-05). In other words, Republican nonincumbents tweeted much more than Republican incumbents on average. However, neither the
partisan lean of a district (p = 0.192) nor region was statistically significant in this model.
As expected, Models 1 and 3 suggest that candidates running in swing districts or
districts favoring the other party would be expected to tweet more than their peers. However,
these models have very small adjusted R2 values of 0.081 and 0.014, meaning that they explain
little of the variability in the dependent variable (the log number of tweets). By comparison,
models 2 and 4 are better, as they have larger adjusted R2 values and so capture more of the
variability in the log number of tweets. According to models 2 and 4, the partisan lean of a
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district did not have a statistically significant relationship with how much a Democrat or
Republican tweeted.

4.3 Major Issues
4.3.1 Economy
4.3.1.1 Tariffs

Democrats were much more likely than Republicans to discuss Trump’s tariffs. Of the
1,314 tweets that included the word “tariff”3, 87 percent (1,149) were sent by Democrats while
only 13 percent (165) were sent by Republicans.
However, most candidates hardly discussed tariffs at all. Only 55 Democrats and seven
Republicans mentioned tariffs in more than five tweets. Only 27 Republicans and one
Republican mentioned tariffs in more than ten tweets. Four Democrats – Dwight Evans (D-PA),
Justin Kanew (D-TN), Renee Haagenson (D-MO), and Ryan Watts (D-NC) – were clear outliers

3

Searched for (a) “tariff” and (b) “Tariff”.
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in the data, sending more than 40 tweets about tariffs. In fact, the median Democrat and median
Republican did not include the word “tariff” in a single tweet.
Most Democratic candidates were opposed to Trump’s tariffs, citing their negative effect
on the U.S. economy and jobs. One candidate, Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), described them as
“dangerous and short-sighted behavior” that hurt workers and businesses. Similarly, Lori Trahan
(D-MA) described tariffs as a “burden to the American people.” In her tweet, Trahan also
emphasized that the United States should work with allies “to enforce global trade norms” and
not “let escalating tensions spiral out of control.”
In contrast, Republicans were divided into pro-tariff and anti-tariff camps. Some
candidates, such as Rudy Peters (R-CA) and Danny Tarkanian (R-NV), emphasized how other
countries were not playing by the “rules” of international trade. Peters highlighted the theft of
U.S. trade secrets and how that eroded American firms’ competitive edge. Similarly, Tarkanian
emphasized how other countries used their own tariffs and non-monetary trade barriers at the
expense of American workers. To candidates such as Peters and Tarkanian, tariffs were a way to
have other countries comply with the “rules”. Other Republicans, meanwhile, were opposed to
Trump’s trade policy. Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) argued that the tariffs should be “modified to target
bad actors” and not “allied nations like Canada, Mexico, and the E.U. Justin Amash (R-MI) went
further, decrying Trump’s tariffs as corporate welfare that benefitted “the few through a tax
imposed on all Americans.” In another tweet, he also called the policy “protectionist” and
“economic incompetence.”
These results provide two major insights. First, Republican elite opinion was more split
than Republican popular opinion on the issue of tariffs. Whereas a large majority – over 70
percent – of Republican voters said tariffs were a good thing for the United States (Watson,
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2018), some candidates such as Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) and Justin Amash (R-MI) took issue with
Trump’s trade policy. Second, candidates of both parties discussed tariffs less than one might
expect, given their news coverage and impact on U.S. trade relations with other countries
(Gonzalez, 2018).
4.3.1.2 Tax cuts vs. tax reform

Democrats and Republicans used very different diction to describe Trump’s tax cuts. Of
the 2,873 tweets that included the term “tax cut”4, most – 64 percent (1831) – were sent by
Democrats, while only 36 percent (1042) were sent by Republicans. By comparison, only 16
percent (142) of the 909 tweets that included the term “tax reform”5 were sent by Democrats,
while 84 percent (767) were sent by Republicans. In short, the two parties framed the issue very
differently, providing evidence of language polarization.
However, most candidates hardly discussed Trump’s tax cuts. The median Democrat only
mentioned the term “tax cut” in two tweets, while the median Republican only used the term in
one tweet. More strikingly, the median Democrat and median Republican did not include the
term “tax reform” in a single tweet. These results are unexpected, given that tax reform was the

4
5

Searched for (a) “tax cut”, (b) “Tax Cut”, (c) “Tax cut”, (d) “TAX CUT”, and (e) “taxcut”.
Searched for (a) “tax reform”, (b) “Tax Reform”, (c) “tax reform”, and (d) “taxreform”.
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Trump administration’s biggest legislative accomplishment to date (Soffen & Fischer-Baum,
2017).
Democratic candidates were strongly opposed to Trump’s tax cuts, calling them fiscally
irresponsible for increasing the size of the federal deficit. Many candidates, including current
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), speculated that the GOP would then use the rising deficit
as an excuse to “cut” Social Security and Medicare benefits. Another critique, raised by David
Brill (D-AZ), is that the tax cuts were regressive. As he put it, most of the benefits would go to
billionaires and then “our children and grandchildren will pay the balance.” One last argument,
raised by Julie Oliver (D-TX), is that the tax cuts were hypocritical. Oliver questioned the need
to give billions in tax cuts to corporations when the United States “apparently can’t afford to feed
every needy child or family.”
In comparison, Republican candidates spoke very positively of Trump’s tax cuts. Robert
Aderholt (R-AL) said that 90 percent of Americans would see bigger paychecks as a result of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). He also claimed that tax cuts boosted economic growth, leading
to the U.S. economy hitting three percent growth in 2018. Bill Flores (R-TX), meanwhile, argued
that tax cuts allowed employers to “hire more workers, open new facilities, and offer their
employees increased benefits.”
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4.3.2 Gun Policy
4.3.2.1 Gun Violence

Democrats were far more likely than Republicans to discuss gun violence. Of the 2,574
tweets that included the term “gun violence”, 6 essentially all of them – 99 percent (2,537) – were
sent by Democrats. The median Democrat used the term in three tweets, whereas the median
Republican did not use the term at all. Note, though, that some candidates were unusually vocal
on this issue. 31 Democrats used the term “gun violence” in more than 20 tweets. In fact, six
Democrats – Ayanna Pressley (D-MA), Debbie Mucarsel-Powell (D-FL), Harley Rouda (D-CA),
Jennifer Wexton (D-VA), Mike Levin (D-CA), and Theodore Deutch (D-FL) – used the term in
more than 40 tweets.
Democrats overwhelmingly agreed that gun violence was a huge problem in the United
States, even if they disagreed about potential solutions. As Mallory Hagan (D-AL) and Jim
Lagevin (D-RI) separately pointed out, over 30,000 Americans lose their lives to gun violence

6

Searched for (a) gunviolence, (b) gun violence, (c) Gun violence, and (d) Gun Violence.
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each year. To both candidates, many of these deaths were potentially preventable if stronger gun
control measures were in place. Other Democrats, such as Chintal Desai (D-AR), highlighted
school shootings, arguing that Congress should “work to create a country where it's not
necessary to have lockdown jingles posted in kindergarten classrooms.” Elite opinion is
consistent with popular opinion, as Democratic voters were also much more concerned than
Republican voters about the threat of gun violence (Oliphant, 2017).
4.3.2.2 National Rifle Association

Democrats were more likely than Republicans to discuss the National Rifle Association.
Of the 2,661 tweets that included the term “NRA”7, a large majority – 83 percent (2,661) – were
sent by Democrats while only 17 percent (444) were sent by Republicans. This result is
surprising, given how delicately Democrats treaded on the issue of guns in past election cycles
(McDaniel, 2018).
Another unexpected finding that most candidates barely tweeted about the NRA, given
how much news coverage the organization received. The median Democrat only mentioned the

7

Searched for: (a) NRA, (b) National Rifle Association

Ausubel 61
NRA in a single tweet while the median Republican did not mention the organization at all.
Rather, a few candidates from both candidates were unusually vocal on the issue. 24 Democrats
and two Republicans mentioned the NRA in over 20 tweets. In fact, two Democrats – Harley
Rouda (D-CA) and Julia Peacock (D-CA) – and one Republican – Janice Arnold-Jones (R-NM)
– mentioned the NRA in over a hundred tweets.
Compared to in previous election cycles, Democrats were much more outspoken in
opposing the NRA. Many candidates, such as Peter Joffrion (D-AL), refused to accept money
from the NRA, claiming that “the people of this country wanted elected officials who protect
them, not special interest groups.” Others, such as Ann Kirkpatrick (D-AZ), expressed pride in
earning a F rating from the NRA. Democrats also questioned the NRA’s motives in opposing
“even small reforms.” Jared Huffman (D-CA) argued that their ultimate goal was not protecting
Americans’ constitutional rights but to “sell as many guns as possible.” Democratic elite opinion
is consistent with how most Democratic voters wanted to stand up to the NRA (Igielnik &
Brown, 2017).
By contrast, most Republican candidates supported the NRA, a group they perceived as
defending the Second Amendment. As Travis Wines (R-MI) put it: “I don’t understand the beef
with the @NRA. They are literally dedicating their entire existence to protect our rights.”
Whereas Democratic candidates flaunted F ratings from the NRA, Republican candidates such as
Martha Roby (R-AL) and Mike Bost (R-IL) emphasized their endorsements from the group. In
addition, Republicans questioned Democrats’ assumption that the presence of weapons is to
blame for gun violence. As Gerhard Gressmann (R-NC) argued: “Guns don’t kill people…
people who don’t value life kill people!” Republican elite opinion is consistent with how most
Republican voters supported the NRA (Igielnik & Brown, 2017).
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4.3.2.3 Second Amendment

Republicans were more likely than Democrats to discuss the Second Amendment 8. Of the
599 tweets that mentioned the amendment, 69 percent (414) were sent by Republicans while
only 31 percent (185) were sent by Democrats. This discrepancy exists despite Democrats
tweeting more overall.
One surprising finding is that most candidates hardly mentioned the amendment, if at all.
The median Democrat and the median Republican did not mention the Second Amendment in a
single tweet. In addition, only one Democrat and five Republicans mentioned the Second
Amendment in over ten tweets. One candidate is a clear outlier: Janice Arnold-Jones (R-NM),
who mentioned the Second Amendment in 75 tweets. One possible explanation for the lack of
tweets is that the Second Amendment is a complicated topic that cannot be adequately expressed
in 280-character tweets.

8

Searched for: (a) 2nd Amendment, (b) 2nd amendment, (c) second amendment, (d) Second Amendment.
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Democratic candidates argued on Twitter that it was possible to pass gun control
legislation while still honoring the Second Amendment. As Lee Ann Dugas (D-LA) put it: “I
100% support the 2nd Amendment. I am certain that the vast majority of other Democrats support
it as well.” However, there was internal disagreement over what gun control measures were
permissible under the Second Amendment. Some candidates, such as Jim Himes (D-CT) and
Vangie Williams (D-VA), advocated in favor of relatively moderate legislation, such as universal
background checks. Others, such as Jared Huffman (D-CA), went further, arguing that an assault
weapons ban was constitutional. However, many candidates, such as James Thompson (D-KS),
disagreed with Huffman, claiming that the Supreme Court’s Heller decision made such a ban
unconstitutional.
In contrast, most Republicans took an absolutist position on the Second Amendment,
arguing that few, if any, restrictions should be placed on Americans’ gun rights. As Danny
Tarkanian (R-NV) put it: “I don’t support gun control. I fully support the 2 nd Amendment. As
upstanding citizens, we have the right to own guns. I’ll protect that right and fight against
attempts to water down or take away our rights.” Elise Stefanik (R-NY) was even more blunt: “I
support the 2nd Amendment. My opponent does not.” Candidates such as Ross Spano (R-FL) also
argued that guns ultimately made Americans safer when they were in the “hands of good
people.”
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4.3.3 Healthcare
4.3.3.1 Healthcare

Between the two parties, Democrats were far more likely to tweet about healthcare. Of
the 11,982 tweets that included the word “healthcare”9, 90 percent (10,806) were sent by
Democrats while only 10 percent (1,176) were sent by Republicans. The median Democrat used
the word “healthcare” in 17 tweets, whereas the median Republican only used it in one tweet.
The data provides strong evidence of a partisan intensity gap on the perceived importance of the
issue, given that Democrats tweeted much more than Republicans about healthcare.
One caveat is that some candidates, mainly Democrats, used the word an unusually large
number of times. 68 Democrats and three Republicans used the word “healthcare” in more than
50 tweets. In fact, five Democrats – Antonio Delgado (D-NY), Julie Oliver (D-TX), Liuba
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Grechen Shirley (D-NY), Renee Hoagenson (D-MO), and Rob Davidson (D-MI) – used the
word in more than 150 tweets.
Practically all Democratic candidates agreed with the assumption that healthcare is a
basic right that everyone – including the poor and the chronically ill – should have access to.
However, there was internal disagreement about which specific policies pursue. Some
candidates, such as Joffrion (D-AL), advocated for bipartisan fixes to the Affordable Care Act.
Others, such as Danner Kline (D-AL), said there should be a Medicare buy-in option at age 55.
Some, such as David Brill (D-AZ), argued for a public option, a government-run health
insurance plan to compete with private plans. The most progressive policy, advocated by
candidates such as Ro Khanna (D-CA), was to implement a single-payer healthcare system, in
which one entity collects all health care fees and pays for all healthcare costs” (“Single-payer
system”). Khanna also questioned why universal healthcare is “too expensive for the United
States, when every other industrialized country on earth can guarantee healthcare to every
person.”
In comparison, Republicans advocated for “free market” solutions to healthcare rooted in
capitalism. As Michael Guest (R-MS) put it: “We need to find free market solutions that [give]
people options to choose the type of healthcare services that best suit them.” However, besides
committing to free market solutions, candidates framed the issue of healthcare in a range of
ways. Some, such as Debbie Lesko (R-AZ), focused on the shortcomings of single-payer
healthcare. She claimed that a single-payer healthcare system would “cost American taxpayers
an estimated $32 trillion while diminishing the quality of care they receive.” Similarly, Tom
McClintock (R-CA) attacked such a program as “one size fits all” and said that “families should
have the right to choose whatever plan best suits them.” Other candidates, such as Elise Stefanik
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(R-NY), criticized the Affordable Care Act for failing to stop the rise of healthcare costs. A third
approach was to stress bipartisanship. Stefanik (R-NY) emphasized her work in renewing the
Children’s Health Insurance Program for ten years. Steve Von Loor (R-NC) advocated for health
savings accounts as a “bipartisan solution” to healthcare.
These results are not surprising for a couple of reasons. First, elite opinion is consistent
with popular opinion. Democratic voters placed much more emphasis on healthcare as an issue
and were also much more supportive than Republican voters of government intervention in the
healthcare sector (Kiley, 2018). Second, healthcare was one of the main topics discussed in the
dataset, which is consistent with the perceived importance of the issue in news coverage
(Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018).
4.3.3.2 Affordable Care Act vs. ObamaCare

Democrats and Republicans used very different diction to describe the Affordable Care
Act. Of the 1503 tweets that included the term “ACA”10, an overwhelming majority – 96 percent
(1439) – were sent by Democrats, while only four percent (64) were sent by Republicans. By
comparison, 58 percent (217) of the 374 tweets that included the term “Obamacare”11 were sent
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by Republicans, while only 42 percent (157) were sent by Democrats. These findings provide
further evidence of language polarization between the two parties. In addition, the data suggest a
partisan intensity gap, given how Democrats tweeted more than Republicans about the ACA.
Democratic candidates spoke positively of the Affordable Care Act, even as they
acknowledged the need for bipartisan fixes. Peter Joffrion (D-AL) argued that Congress should
work together to “stabilize programs for the exchanges, support Medicaid expansion, retain the
individual mandate, and retain the cost-sharing subsidies.” Democrats also emphasized how the
ACA improved healthcare for millions of Americans. Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) stressed how the
ACA led to “millions of people [being] able to get affordable health insurance for the first time.”
Grijalva (D-AZ) also claimed that patients “gained critical protections for things like pre-existing
conditions.” Democratic candidates also blasted Republicans for undermining the Affordable
Care Act. For example, Grijalva (D-AZ) warned that “Trump’s ACA sabotage could make
insurance premiums spike by 90 percent over the next three years.”
In comparison, Republicans were critical of the Affordable Care Act. Carlos Curbelo said
that the ACA was designed to serve “big special interests” instead of patients. Elise Stefanik (RNY) faulted the ACA for “mandated purchase, rising costs, increased deductibles, and
decreasing choices.” Joe Vitollo (R-NY) claimed that the ACA resulted in many Americans
losing their doctors and their insurance plans.
Politicians of both parties argued that people with preexisting conditions should be able
to get medical coverage. However, Democrats claimed that Republicans were being
disingenuous by making this case. Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) said that “if you voted to repeal the
ACA, you voted to take away protections for preexisting conditions.” Similarly, Clarke Tucker
(D-AR) claimed that the AHCA, a bill to partially repeal the Affordable Care Act, would have
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“removed critical protections for people with preexisting conditions.” In contrast, Republicans
such as John Faso (R-NY) argued that these attacks were misleading and motivated by politics.
4.3.3.3 Medicare and Medicaid

Democrats were also significantly more likely than Republicans to tweet about Medicare
and Medicaid. Of the 4,457 tweets that mentioned Medicare12, 93 percent (4,135) were sent by
Democrats while only seven percent (322) were sent by Republicans. The median Democrat
mentioned Medicare in five tweets while the median Republican did not mention it at all,
evidence of a partisan intensity gap.
Note, though, that some candidates mentioned Medicare in an unusually large number of
tweets. 15 Democrats mentioned the federal program in over 50 tweets. In fact, four candidates –
Renee Hoagenson (D-MO), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), and Rob Davidson (DMI) – are clear outliers for mentioning Medicare in over a hundred tweets.
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Of the 1,872 tweets that mentioned Medicaid13, almost all – 97 percent (1816) – were
sent by Democrats while only three percent (56) were sent by Republicans. Once again, this
finding provides evidence of a partisan intensity gap in the perceived importance of the issue.
However, most candidates hardly discussed Medicaid on Twitter, regardless of their political
party. The median Democrat only mentioned Medicaid in a single tweet while the median
Republican did not mention it at all.
Another caveat is that some candidates talked about Medicaid in an unusually large
number of tweets, skewing results. For example, 19 Democrats mentioned the federal program in
over 20 tweets. In fact, four Democrats – Jennifer Wexton (D-VA), Justin Kanew (D-TN), Renee
Hoagenson (D-MO), and Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) – mentioned Medicaid in more than 40 tweets.
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4.3.4 Immigration
4.3.4.1 Illegal immigrant vs. undocumented immigrant

Democratic and Republican politicians used very different diction to describing
immigrants unlawfully residing in the United States. Of the 432 tweets that included the term
“illegal immigrant”14, 93 percent (401) were sent by Republicans while only seven percent (31)
were sent by Democrats. In comparison, 89 percent (66) of the 74 tweets that included the term
“undocumented immigrant”15 were sent by Democrats while only 11 percent (8) were sent by
Republicans. These findings provide strong evidence of language polarization between the two
parties.
Many Democrats argued that undocumented immigrants are not being treated with
enough compassion. Gil Cisneros (D-CA) faulted Trump for “comparing undocumented
immigrants to animals” and so showing a “blatant lack of empathy, understanding, and
compassion.” Ryan Watts (D-NC) claimed that the “idea that ‘illegal immigrants’ contribute to
drugs/human trafficking is a bad stereotype and tactic to spread fear.” Julia Peacock (D-CA)
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faulted Trump’s family separation policy for being needlessly cruel. As she saw it, the migrants
are “human beings fleeing violence and persecution” who should be treated with compassion.
She went as far as accusing the Trump administration of “committing crimes against humanity.”
As section 3.2.4 illustrates, Democratic elite opinion is consistent with Democratic popular
opinion. Most Democratic voters also wanted the federal government to treat undocumented
immigrants with more compassion (“Little Partisan Agreement”, 2018).
In comparison, the average Republican took a much more hardline stance on
immigration. Omar Navarro (R-CA) stated that illegal immigrants are a financial drain, costing
the state of California tens of millions of dollars. Gerhard Gressman (R-SC) argued that illegal
immigrants pose a safety risk to American citizens, as they commit thousands of assaults,
murders, rapes, and robberies each year. Peter G. Olson (R-TX) claimed that illegal immigrants
are committing voter fraud. In fact, some candidates went so far as to accuse their opponents of
caring more about “illegals” than about native-born Americans. For example, John Fitzgerald (RCA) tweeted to his opponent: “Unlike you, I will fight for the legal citizens of America by
stopping the unabated flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S.” As section 3.2.4 illustrates,
Republican elite opinion is consistent with Republican popular opinion. Most Republican voters
also considered illegal immigration to be a very big problem (“Little Partisan Agreement”,
2018).
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4.3.4.2 DACA and DREAMers

Democrats were much more likely to discuss DREAMers. Of the 1,912 tweets that
include either the words “DREAMer” or “DACA”16, a large majority – 86 percent (1969) – were
sent by Democrats while only 14 percent (314) were sent by Republicans, providing evidence of
an intensity gap on the perceived importance of the issue.
One surprising finding, though, is that most candidates hardly discussed the issue, given
how much news coverage DACA received. The median Democrat only sent one tweet that
included the words DREAMer or DACA; the median Republican sent no tweets with one of
those two words. However, a few candidates, almost all Democrats, were unusually vocal about
the DREAMers. 26 Democrats and two Republicans used either the term Dreamer or DACA in
more than 20 tweets. In fact, seven Democrats – Debra Haaland (D-NM), Grace Meng (D-NY),
Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Josh Harder (D-CA), Katie Porter (D-CA), Lisa Brown (D-WA), and
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Veronica Escobar (D-TX) – and one Republican – Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) – used either the term
DREAMer or DACA in over 40 tweets.
There was a consensus among Democrats that DREAMers needed to be protected. As Ian
Todd (D-MN) said: “Dreamers are people are living in the only home they’ve ever known. It
would be beyond cruel to deport them.” Many candidates, such as Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), argued
that the “crisis” was ultimately President Trump’s fault, as he terminated the DACA program in
September 2017. Others, such as Andrew Janz (D-CA) and John Michael Galbraith (D-OH),
advocated for a “Clean Dream Act”, which would grant legal status to DREAMers.
In contrast, Republicans were divided on the issue of DREAMers. Some candidates, such
as Jeff Denham (R-CA), advocated for immigration reform, which would strengthen border
security but also “provide [a] permanent fix for dreamers.” Others, such as Steve King (R-IA),
called DACA “amnesty” and said that “no civilized nation should be held hostage to amnesty as
a requirement to secure its border.” In fact, some candidates, such as Steve Von Loor (R-NC),
blasted their opponents for “[choosing] DACA recipients over [their] constituents.”
4.3.4.3 Family Separation
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Democrats were much more likely to discuss family separation. Of the 1,523 tweets that
mention the issue17, almost all – 97 percent (1,482) – were sent by Democrats, while only three
percent (41) were sent by Republicans. Even more so than in the DACA example, the family
separation results provide evidence of a partisan intensity gap.
One caveat is that most candidates of both parties barely discussed family separation. The
median Democrat only mentioned it in one tweet and the median Republican mentioned it in
none. The lack of tweets about family separation is surprising, given how news coverage of the
Trump administration’s policy raised the salience of immigration as an issue. As already
discussed, only 14 percent of Americans saw immigration as the nation’s top issue in June 2018
(Newport, “Immigration Surges”, 2018). In July 2018, by contrast, a much larger share – 22
percent – saw it as the nation’s top issue (Newport, “Immigration Surges”, 2018).
A few candidates were unusually vocal about family separation. 25 candidates, all
Democrats, mentioned family separation in more than ten tweets. In fact, seven candidates –
Jennifer Zimmerman (D-FL), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Josh McCall (D-GA), Pramila Jayapal
(D-WA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), and Veronica Escobar (D-TX) –
mentioned it in more than 20 tweets.
Democrats were unanimously opposed to President Trump’s family separation policy.
Mallory Hagan (D-AL) said what he was “committing against innocent children [was] nothing
short of child abuse.” Ro Khanna (D-CA) blasted the “brutality and inhumanity” of the policy.
Ted Lieu (D-CA) argued that family separation was “inconsistent with the teachings of Jesus
Christ.” In addition, candidates suggested that Trump was using the children as “pawns.” As
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Ruben Gallego (D-AZ) put it, children were being used as “leverage to get Democrats and others
in Congress to vote for a border wall.” Democratic elite opinion is consistent with how 91
percent of Democratic voters opposed the policy (Matthews, 2018).
In comparison, the few Republicans who tweeted about family separation were split on
the issue. Some joined Democrats in condemning the policy. Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) called the
policy “reckless”, and said that Congress’ priority should be “dealing with this in a
comprehensive way” and “showing kindness.” Roger Marshall (R-KS) described family
separations at the border as a “terrible situation.” By contrast, others questioned Democrats’
credibility on the issue. According to Jeffrey Anthony Dove Jr. (R-VA), Democrats “knew
family separations were happening for years” and yet his opponent did not “say or do anything
about it.” Renee Zeno (R-NY) claimed that the news about family separation was
“misinformation” and that the Trump administration “did not create a policy of separating
families at the border.” Gerhard Gressmann (R-SC) claimed that Democrats originally created
the family separation policy but did not “like their own law” and so blamed Republicans. The
split in Republican elite opinion is consistent with how Republican voters were also divided on
the issue. According to one poll, 46 percent approved of family separation, whereas 32 opposed
it (Matthews, 2018).
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4.3.4.4 Trump’s Wall

Democrats were slightly more likely than Republicans to discuss Trump’s wall. Of the
2,043 tweets that mention the issue 18, 61 percent (1,241) were sent by Democrats while 39
percent (802) were sent by Republicans.
However, most candidates of both parties hardly mentioned Trump’s wall. The median
Democrat only mentioned it in one tweet and the median Republican mentioned it in none. These
findings are surprising, given how Trump’s proposed border wall was one of the key parts of his
2016 presidential campaign (Trump, 2015). However, a few candidates were unusually vocal
about Trump’s wall. Eight Democrats and nine Republicans mentioned the wall in more than 20
tweets. In fact, two candidates – Lisa Brown (D-WA) and Tim Donnelly (R-CA) – mentioned it
in over 50 tweets.
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Most Democrats were opposed Trump’s border wall proposal. Tabitha Isner (D-AL)
described it as “an irresponsible use of […] money”, her justification being that two-thirds of
undocumented people enter the United States with a visa. Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) claimed that a
wall along the U.S.-Mexico border would “irreparably damage delicate ecosystems and border
communities.” He also called the Trump administration’s “attempt to use DREAMers as
‘leverage’ to build a border wall disgusting.” Mike Levin (D-CA) accused President of
hypocrisy, as the President went from saying Mexico would pay for the wall to saying that
taxpayers would. Flynn Broady Jr. (D-GA) said that “the thought of building a wall only our
southern border speaks to racism” and appeals to Trump’s base. Elite opinion is consistent with
popular opinion, given that Democratic voters were strongly opposed to Trump’s border wall
(Newport, “Border Walls”, 2018).
In comparison, most Republicans supported Trump’s proposal. Rick Crawford (R-AR)
said that the wall would “keep our borders secure” from international drug cartels. Johnny
Nalbandian argued that “constructing a wall [was] an imperative step to protect [American]
sovereignty.” Steve King (R-IA) claimed that border security was necessary to protect the United
States from an “invasion” of migrants. Some candidates also accused Democrats of flip-flopping
on the issue of the wall. For example, Kevin Yoder (R-KS) claimed that Senate Minority Leader
was “for border security before he was against it.” Elite opinion is consistent with popular
opinion, as most Republican voters also supported Trump’s border wall (Newport, “Border
Walls”, 2018).
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4.3.5 Russia
4.3.5.1 Putin or Russia

Democrats were far more likely than Republicans to discuss the issue of Russia. Of the
3,818 tweets that include either the words “Putin” or “Russia”19, most – 3,183 (83 percent) –
were sent by Democrats and only 635 (17 percent) were sent by Republicans. The partisan
intensity gap on the perceived importance of this issue is not surprising, given that Democratic
campaigns, such as Hillary Clinton’s, were targeted by Russia in the 2016 cycle. By comparison,
Russia posed much less of a risk to Republican campaigns.
However, most candidates barely discussed Russia. The median Democrat only sent two
tweets that included the words “Putin” or “Russia”, and the median Republican sent no tweets
including one of those words. This finding is surprising, as Russian interference in the 2016
election was often a front-page story in newspapers (Lawler, 2017). In other words, there appears
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to have been a disconnect between how important the mainstream media considered the Russia
story and how important the average politician considered it.
A few candidates, mostly Democrats, were unusually vocal about the issue of Russia. 62
Democrats and 15 Republicans used either the term “Putin” or “Russia” in more than 10 tweets.
In fact, six Democrats – Harley Rouda (D-CA), Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), Jared Huffman (DCA), Lee Ann Dugas (D-LA), Josh McCall (D-GA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA) – used one of the two
terms in over a hundred tweets.
Democratic candidates argued that Russia must be held accountable for interfering in the
2016 election. In addition, Democrats had a broad consensus that Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference should be unimpeded. Several candidates,
including current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, also expressed concern about Russia meddling in
the 2018 midterms. Pelosi said it was “insane” that Russians “[refused] to strengthen… states’
[election] systems that could be vulnerable to Russian attacks.” Elite opinion is consistent with
popular opinion, as Democratic voters also expressed concern about Russian interference in the
2018 midterms (Kirby, 2018).
In comparison, Republican candidates were more split on the issue of Russia. Among the
candidates who tweeted about the issue, the majority viewed the Mueller investigation with
skepticism. Johnny Nalbandian (R-CA) argued that Democrats were “wasting millions… of
taxpayer dollars on a useless, baseless Russia investigation” with the ultimate goal of impeaching
President Trump. Devin Nunes claimed that the “Clinton machine [was] spreading
disinformation to continue Russia conspiracy theories.” Tim Donnelly (R-CA) even tweeted that
there was a “better chance of Mueller ending up in jail than of [Trump] being impeached on
account of Russia collusion.” Other Republicans, meanwhile, were vocally opposed to Trump’s
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Russia policy. Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) said that “any effort to undermine the Special Counsel’s
investigation into Russian efforts to interfere with [American] elections [was] unacceptable.”
Elise Stefanik (R-NY) tweeted that “Russia is an adversary” and that United States “must
continue to work with [its] allies to counter Russia’s influence around the world.” If anything,
Republican elites were more divided than Republican voters on the issue of Russia, most of
whom expressed skepticism about the impartiality and usefulness of the Mueller investigation
(Kirby, 2018).
4.3.6 Supreme Court
4.3.6.1 Brett Kavanaugh

Democrats were more likely than Republicans to mention Brett Kavanaugh on Twitter.
Of the 3,424 tweets that include the word “Kavanaugh”20, 73 percent (2,486) were sent by
Democrats while only 27 percent (938) were sent by Republicans.
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However, most candidates hardly talked about the Supreme Court nominee at all. The
median Democrat only mentioned him in two tweets, and the median Republican mentioned him
in zero. These results are surprising, given how heated the Kavanaugh hearings became and how
much news coverage they received (Stolberg & Fandos, 2018). Another finding is that some
candidates discussed Kavanaugh an unusually large number of times, skewing results. For
example, 32 Democrats and eight Republicans used the term “Kavanaugh” in more than 20
tweets. In fact, two Democrats – Josh McCall (D-GA) and Renee Hoagenson (D-MO) – and one
Republican – Billy Long (R-MO) – used the term “Kavanaugh” in over a hundred tweets. One
possibility as to why most candidates stayed away from the topic may be that the hearing was a
complex topic that could not be adequately explained in 280-characters. Another possibility is
that there might not have been much political gain in criticizing a Supreme Court nominee.
Democratic candidates were largely opposed to Kavanaugh’s nomination to the Supreme
Court, one reason being his conservative judicial record. As current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
(D-CA) put it: “With a SCOTUS nominee threatening to undo decades of progress and do away
with some of our most fundamental rights, the need to continue the movement that won us the
right to vote 80 years ago could not be clearer or more pressing.” A second, more frequently
cited, reason was sexual assault allegations against him. Sara Dady (D-IL) cited this as a reason
why “the GOP can’t hear women” and why Kavanaugh’s appointment would bring a “tarnish” to
the Supreme Court. A third reason was Kavanaugh’s fiery temperament during his confirmation
hearing. David Brill (D-AZ) said that the nominee’s “behavior at the hearings was
unprofessional and not someone who should be a [Supreme] Court justice.” Elite opinion is
consistent with popular opinion, as Democratic voters also opposed Kavanaugh’s confirmation
(“Marist Poll”, 2018).
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In comparison, nearly all Republican candidates supported Kavanaugh’s nomination.
Martha Roby (R-AL) summed up the consensus when she said: “Judge Kavanaugh is an
excellent choice for the Supreme Court. He is a qualified, conservative jurist who I believe will
serve the American people with dignity.” In contrast to Democrats, Republicans argued that the
sexual assault allegations against Kavanaugh were unfair. Wendy Rogers (R-AZ) argued that the
Democrats were playing a “high level con game in their vicious effort to destroy a fine person.”
Cristina Osmena (R-CA) questioned whether Democrats believed in due process, given that the
allegations against Kavanaugh were unproven. Lisa Remmer (R-CA) said that Democrats would
“do anything to get back into power, and use the demagogue, lying, smear tactics to stir up their
mob.” Elite opinion is consistent with popular opinion, as Republican voters also supported
Kavanaugh’s confirmation (“Marist Poll”, 2018).
4.3.6.2 Christine Blasey Ford
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Democrats were considerably more likely than Republicans to mention Christine Blasey
Ford. Of the 515 tweets that directly reference her 21, 93 percent (477) were sent by Democrats
while only seven percent (38) were sent by Republicans.
Note, though, that most candidates hardly talked about Ford on Twitter. Only seven
Democrats – Dayna Steele (D-TX), Grace Meng (D-NY), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Renee
Hoagenson (D-MO), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Ted Lieu (D-CA), and Veronica Escobar (D-TX) –
and no Republicans said her name more than 10 times. In fact, the median Democrat and the
median Republican did not say her name on Twitter a single time. Again, the lack of tweets is
surprising, given how much media coverage the Kavanaugh hearings received.
Overall, Democrats believed Ford’s allegations of sexual assault. Mallory Hagan (D-AL)
described her as “credible and courageous.” Barbara Lee (D-CA) said that “survivors should be
heard, believed, and be given justice and respect.” Josh McCall said that Ford had “[sacrificed]
her privacy and her safety to tell the truth.”
In comparison, Republicans were divided by how much Ford was telling the truth. Some,
such as Cristina Osmena (R-CA), described her as “likable and trustworthy” but said the same
was also true of Kavanaugh. Osmena speculated that Ford was experiencing a false memory and
that someone besides Kavanaugh was responsible for the sexual assault. Other candidates,
though, were skeptical that her story was credible at all. Charlotte Bergmann (R-TN) said that
the holes in Ford’s story were “glaring.” Ron Bassilian (R-CA) questioned Ford’s character by
calling her an “anti-Trump leftist who participated in the Women’s March and donated to the
DNC.” In his view, attempts to delay Kavanaugh’s nomination looked “increasingly like a
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desperate political ploy.” Joe Vitollo (R-NY) called the allegations an “isolated, unsubstantiated
story.”
4.3.7 The Trump Presidency
4.3.7.1 Donald Trump

Democrats were more likely than Republicans to mention Donald Trump. Of the 29,043
tweets that either say “Trump” or “POTUS”22, 70 percent (20,341) were sent by Democrats
while 30 percent (8,702) were sent by Republicans. The median Democrat mentioned Trump in
16 tweets, while the median Republican only mentioned him in six tweets. These findings are not
surprising, given Trump’s unpopularity. As already discussed, the President’s net approval was
nearly 10 points underwater throughout all of 2018 (“How popular is Donald Trump”, 2018). As
a result, Republicans, especially those running in swing districts, may have been wary of
mentioning Trump’s name.
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One caveat is that some candidates of both parties tweeted about Trump an unusually
large number of times, skewing results. 49 Democrats and 23 Republicans said either “Trump”
or “POTUS” in over a hundred tweets. In fact, five Democrats – Jared Huffman (D-CA), Lee
Ann Dugas (D-LA), Maxine Waters (D-CA), Mike Levin (D-CA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA) – and
two Republicans – Billy Long (R-MO) and Gerhard Gressmann (R-SC) – said either “Trump” or
“POTUS” in over five hundred tweets.
Democratic candidates presented their party as a check on the executive branch. As
Mallory Hagan (D-AL) put it: “Democrats must flip 23 seats to take back the House and hold
Trump accountable.” Another common argument is that Trump and his cabinet were abusing
their power. As Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) argued: “Trump’s cabinet has a concerning penchant for
wasting taxpayer money on their own luxurious lifestyles, only to turn around and demand cuts
to programs that help people.” Grijalva also claimed that the Trump presidency was a “corrupt
exercise in making the Trump family very rich.” A third argument, raised by Grijalva, is that
Trump had poor moral character. Not only did Trump have authoritarian tendencies, but “racism
[was] engrained in his character.” Elite opinion is consistent with popular opinion, as Democratic
voters also held very negative views on the President.
In comparison, Republican candidates cast the Trump presidency in a positive light.
Andy Biggs (R-AZ) argued that Trump’s “agenda of strong borders, free-market healthcare,
lower taxes [and] regulations, and a superior military force [would] #MAGA.” Martha Roby (RAL) claimed that the Trump administration had delivered “meaningful results for Americans”
over the past two years. Another argument, raised by Roby, is that Trump was an outsider
“[willing] to shake things up in Washington” and “step over entrenched partisan lines.” Johnny
Nalbandian (R-CA) said that Trump was the “only President willing to fight off […] corrupt
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establishment politicians” who put “big money backers” first and the American people last. Elite
opinion is consistent with popular opinion, as most Republican voters supported the President.
4.3.7.2 Impeachment

Democrats were slightly more likely than Republicans to mention impeachment. Of the
563 tweets that include the word “impeach”23, 57 percent (322) were sent by Democrats while 43
percent (241) were sent by Republicans. One caveat is that most candidates hardly talked about
impeachment, if at all. The median Democrat and the median Republican did not include the
word “impeach” in a single tweet. In fact, only two candidates – Jared Huffman (D-CA) and Lee
Ann Dugas (D-LA) – used the word “impeach” in more than 30 tweets.
Democratic candidates were divided over what grounds to impeach President Trump.
Some, such as Julia Peacock (D-CA), advocated impeaching Trump as well as Vice President
Mike Pence as soon as Democrats retook the House of Representatives. Similarly, James
Thompson (D-KS) argued that Trump could already be impeached on the grounds of corruption

23

Searched for: (a) impeach, (b) Impeach, and (c) IMPEACH
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and abuse of power. Other candidates, though, were much more cautious when making
recommendations about impeachment. Lee Ann Dugas (D-CA) promised to introduce an article
of impeachment if Trump fired Rod Rosenstein, the Deputy Attorney General. Ruben Gallego
(D-AZ) considered firing Special Counsel Robert Mueller an impeachable offense. Sean
Carrigan (D-SC) said that Congress should impeach Trump if he “[dared] to pardon himself.”
In short, Democratic politicians tended to be cautious when discussing impeachment on
Twitter, qualifying their statements or avoiding the topic altogether. They were considerably less
enthusiastic than Democratic voters about wanting to impeach Trump. According to a
Quinnipiac poll from April 2018, 71 percent of Democratic politicians supported impeaching the
President, versus only 38 percent of the public as a whole (“U.S. Voters Believe Comey”, 2018).
One reason for politicians’ relative caution is that they feared the impeachment would be a
political loser. Not only did impeachment poll poorly among the general public but it might be
impossible to carry out (Prokop, “Impeachment”, 2019). As Prokop (2019, “Impeachment”)
explains, even if the House approved impeachment, about 20 Senate Republican votes would be
required to actually remove Trump from office, which would not happen unless “damning new
information emerged.”
Similarly, most Republican politicians barely discussed impeachment on Twitter, if at all.
However, a few candidates tried to use the threat of impeachment to fire up their base to vote.
Ron Bassilian (D-CA) cautioned that Democrats would impeach Trump on day one if they
retook the House. Billy Long (R-MO) said that Democrats would do “everything in their power
to impeach Kavanaugh from the Supreme Court if they [took] control of Congress in
November.” For this reason, both candidates said it was imperative for Republicans to vote on
Election Day.
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4.4 Discussion
Section 4.2 (Basic Summary Statistics) provides a few interesting insights. First, the
Twitter dataset is very skewed. Whereas the average candidate sent 579 tweets between January
1st and November 6th 2018, the median candidate only sent 304. Similarly, the average tweet
received about 258 likes and 93 retweets, when excluding tweets originally from other accounts.
However, the median tweet only received 13 likes and five retweets.
Second, Democratic politicians were more active on social media than Republican
politicians. 295,519 of the tweets (73 percent) in the dataset were sent by Democrats, whereas
only 107,989 (27 percent) were sent by Republicans. The median Democrat tweeted 560.5 times
between January 1 st and November 6th 2018, whereas the median Republican only tweeted 175
times. All of this suggests that Democratic politicians were more energized on social media, or at
least on Twitter, compared to their Republican counterparts.
Third, Democratic accounts received more engagement compared to Republican
accounts. The median Democrat had 3,811 followers, whereas the median Republican had only
1,912 followers. In addition, Democrats’ posts received more likes and retweets, when excluding
posts originally from other accounts. The median Democratic tweet received 18 likes and seven
retweets, whereas the median Republican tweet received only seven likes and two retweets. This
evidence suggests Democratic voters, not just politicians, may have been more energized on
Twitter compared to their Republican counterparts. However, given how the sample is limited
and how it only includes House candidates’ tweets, this claim is difficult to prove conclusively.
In theory, one might expect candidates running in competitive districts or districts
favoring the other party to tweet more. These candidates were less “safe” and so arguably needed
to do more voter outreach on social media. OLS regression models from section 4.2 contradict
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this hypothesis. When controlling for incumbency and region, the partisan lean of a district did
not have a statistically significant relationship with how much a Democrat or Republican
tweeted. However, the same regression models suggest that incumbency was a strong predictor
of how much candidates tweeted. Democratic non-incumbents tweeted much more than
Democratic incumbents on average; the same is true of Republican non-incumbents versus
Republican incumbents.
Section 4.3 (Major Issues) provides overwhelming evidence of political polarization.
From the economy, to healthcare, to immigration, there were hardly any issues in which
Democratic and Republican candidates’ views had significant overlap. And even their word
choices are revealing; often, Democrats and Republicans used very different diction to refer to
the same issues (e.g. ACA vs. Obamacare). In addition, elite opinion was consistent with public
opinion. Democratic politicians shared similar views with Democratic voters on most issues, and
the same was true of the relationship between Republican politicians and voters. However, it
remains an open question, outside of the scope of this paper, how much politicians took cues
from voters when deciding which issues to emphasize.
As expected, healthcare was mentioned frequently on Twitter. 11,982 tweets include the
word “healthcare”, 4,457 mention Medicare, 1,872 mention Medicaid, and 1,503 mention the
Affordable Care Act. These results come as no surprise, as healthcare was a major – if not the
top – issue for voters (Newport, “Top Issues”, 2018). Another issue that came up often was the
Trump presidency. 29,043 tweets include either the terms “Trump” or “POTUS”. Given how the
2018 midterms were partially a referendum on Trump, these results are also unsurprising (Scott,
2018).
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The biggest surprise in the data was how little particular issues were mentioned, such as
the Kavanaugh hearings, Russia, and tax reform. Some of these stories received considerable
news coverage, suggesting a disconnect between which issues were prioritized by politicians and
the mainstream media. Another possibility is that candidates found these issues too complex to
discuss in 280 characters or less (Perez, 2017).
Importantly, the results from this study should not be overgeneralized. One reason is that
the sample consists of just House candidates. Most likely, local politicians and Senate candidates
discussed a distinct set of issues. A second reason is that the sample just consists of candidates’
personal Twitter accounts, not their official accounts. Official accounts are subject to federal law
and House rules, and are not supposed to include campaign information (Woods, 2014). Third,
the scope of the study is January 1 st to November 6th 2018. Each election cycle is different and so
these results should not be used to predict congressional candidates’ behavior in 2020 or beyond.
In addition, Twitter’s impact on election outcomes should not be overstated. After all,
only 24 percent of American adults used the site in 2018 and they were not necessarily
representative of the U.S. population (“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). In addition, only a
minority of Americans actually follow politicians on social media (Anderson, 2015).
Nevertheless, this study was useful to see how Democratic and Republican politicians framed
issues.

4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Methodology
This thesis might be the first academic paper to analyze Twitter data from the 2018
midterm elections. In this sense, the findings in the paper are novel and could be used to guide
future research. The dataset is also very large, consisting of over 400,000 tweets, providing a
comprehensive snapshot of the 2018 midterms.
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However, the methodology comes with shortcomings. First, January 1 st 2018 is an
imperfect start date to the study, as candidates declared their candidacies at very different times
(“Filing Deadlines”, 2018). Second, many Democratic and Republican candidates lacked a
personal Twitter account and so were excluded from the sample. Third, some candidates used
Twitter much more than others, skewing results. Fourth, this study only looks at Twitter data,
while politicians were also active on other social media platforms (e.g. Facebook). Most likely,
politicians used different social media sites in distinct manners and so these results should not be
overgeneralized. Fifth, irrelevant search results sometimes came up when looking for key terms.
For example, when searching for the word “wall”, most but not all of the results had to do with
President Trump’s proposed border fence on the U.S.-Mexico border.
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5 Areas for Future Research
5.1 Issue Saliency
The Twitter analysis clearly shows that some issues were more salient than others. For
example, politicians of both parties talked a lot about healthcare but not so much about Russia.
However, it is unclear from the data to what extent politicians took cues from voters or
vice versa when deciding which issues to emphasize in the 2018 midterms. There are two
predominant theories that could explain issue saliency on Twitter: issue ownership theory and
riding the wave theory. Under issue ownership theory, parties highlight issues on which they
have an advantage “to increase the salience of these issues among voters”, and by doing so, “reap
electoral gains” (Kluver & Sagarzazu, 2015, p. 380). This is a top-down process in which voters
take cues from political parties (Kluver & Sagarzazu, 2015, p. 384). In contrast, an opposing
hypothesis is riding the wave theory, which assumes that parties “primarily respond to voters by
highlighting political issues that are salient in the minds of citizens” (Kluver & Sagarzazu, 2015,
p. 380). Their goal is to “benefit electorally from being responsive to the electorate” (Kluver &
Sagarzazu, 2015, p. 383). In short, this a bottom-up process in parties take cues from voters
(Kluver & Sagarzazu, p. 384).

5.2 Other Social Media Platforms
In 2018, other social media platforms were much more popular than Twitter. Whereas
only 24 percent of American adults used Twitter, 73 percent used YouTube, 68 percent used
Facebook, 35 percent used Instagram, 29 percent used Pinterest, and 27 percent used Snapchat
(“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). In future studies, researchers may want to study how
Democratic and Republican candidates used these other sites in the 2018 midterms.
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Conclusion
Social media was a fundamental part of political campaigning in the 2018 midterms.
Politicians used it as a platform to persuade and mobilize voters, and ultimately win elections.
However, Democratic and Republican candidates otherwise used social media very differently.
On sites such as Facebook and Twitter, they emphasized different issues and framed them in
distinct ways. Partisan differences in social media use can potentially be explained by political
polarization and how each party was confronted with unique challenges.
Thinking ahead, it will be interesting to see how congressional candidates use social
media in the 2020 election cycle. One question is whether Democratic candidates will continue
to use Twitter more often than Republican candidates. A second is whether the same issues will
remain salient. There is no question, however, that social media will remain important to
political campaigns, given that seven in ten Americans use some sort of social networking site
(“Social Media Fact Sheet”, 2018). In short, the lessons from the 2018 midterms, as well as from
earlier cycles, will continue to guide how campaigns interact with potential voters online.
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